

Case Studies of Communist Conquest Plans and Occupations in the Third World During the Cold War

By Nevin Gussack

Since the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, the international communist movement sought to impose its will through subversion, terrorism, and even outright military invasions. Tools such as guerrilla “*people’s war*” were utilized by the communists as a means of taking power, especially in political vacuums. Greece, Vietnam, China, British Malaya, and Cuba were some examples of where the communists used “*people’s war*” to achieve their objective of seizing power. One of the earliest communist “*people’s war*” of armed terrorists occurred in the wake of the Axis withdrawal from Greece in 1944. Previously, resistance forces of royalist, republican, or communist-dominated persuasions fought against the Nazis, Italians, and their brutal Greek fascist and militarist collaborators. The Communist National Liberation Front (EAM) and its military arm, the People’s Army for National Liberation (ELAS) seemed to have gained the upper hand in 1944 and 1945. The pro-Allied Greek anti-communist government received assistance from the British and later the United States. The EAM was controlled by the Greek Communist Party (KKE) and implemented totalitarian rule in their zones of occupation. The secret police of the EAM called the Organization for the Protection of the People’s Struggle (OPLA) carried out an assassination campaign in the Peloponnese. One former EAM guerrilla noted to Mark Mazower: “*I was not a regular guerrilla; I was a devil’s guerrilla.*” In August 1943, the EAM leadership in Peloponnese created a “*special organ*” to “*isolate at the right moment*” the “*leaders of the reaction.*” EAM/ELAS also executed Greeks who worked with the British in Delphi. One British Liaison Officer noted that 500 Greeks were executed by the EAM in Attica and Boeotia. Numerous mass graves were dug up by Greek national forces during the period 1945-1946. Blacklists were drawn up by the EAM where royalists, nationalists, and wealthy “*bourgeois*” were targeted.¹ In December 1944, the OPLA knocked on the doors of its enemies in Athens and executed them. By December 25, 1944, OPLA executed 13,500 Greeks.² Ares Velouchiotes, the leader of the ELAS, ordered the execution of some twenty Trotskyite leaders. After the withdrawal of German troops in late 1944, the EAM/ELAS continued to murder Trotskyites, while others were tortured to reveal the names of their colleagues. In a 1946 report to the Central Committee of the Greek Communist Party, Vasilis Bartziotas stated that 600 Trotskyites and anarcho-Marxists were executed by OPLA. In early 1947, the forces under the command of communist General Vafiadis attacked dozens of villages and executed hundreds of peasants. The ranks of the communist army were enlarged by forced recruitment.³

The British also reported that EAM/ELAS forces made use of Greek quislings. Greek businessmen who cooperated with the Germans and the communist included Xanthopoulos (who built fortifications on Crete, Olympus, and the Larissa airfield); Vezanis (who built the Megara airfield for the Germans); and Vasiliadis (who was a dockyard, warehouse, and workshop owner which worked for the Germans). This information was provided by Greeks who worked for

¹ Mazower, Mark. After the War Was Over (Princeton University Press: Princeton NJ 2000) page 156.

² Gage, Nicholas. Eleni (Ballantine Books 1996)

³ Shrader, Charles R. The Withered Vine: Logistics and the Communist Insurgency in Greece, 1945-1949 (Praeger Publishers: Westport CT 1999) pages 159-200.

Allied Missions.⁴ In fact, the KKE initially supported the Italian and the Nazi invaders of Greece during the period of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact (1939-1941). The KKE launched propaganda campaigns against the government and its armed forces during the Nazi-Italian invasion. In November 1940, KKE leader Zachariadis accused the Greek Army of prosecuting a “fascist” and “imperialistic war” against the Axis forces and requested peaceful intervention by the USSR. In December 1940, the so-called Old Central Committee of the KKE issued a manifesto which addressed “*all the workers and public servants, to all soldiers, sailors and airmen, to patriot officers, to the mothers, fathers, wives and children of the fighters and the workers of all neighboring countries.*” This manifesto denounced the war as a struggle among imperialist powers. The Central Committee believed that Italy would not attack Greece, due to the fact that Mussolini had a cooperation agreement with the Soviets. The Manifesto also called for the Greek Army to seek a peace treaty with Italy. In January 1941, KKE leader Zachariadis noted in a letter that “*Metaxas remains the principal enemy of the people and the country. His overthrowing is in the most immediate and vital interest of our people...the peoples and soldiers of Greece and Italy are not enemies but brothers, and their solidarity will stop the war waged by capitalist exploiters.*”⁵ While Greece was being bombed by the German *Luftwaffe*, KKE leader Ioannis Ioannidis recalled a situation where a regional Communist cadre proclaimed “*The Germans will not bomb us. The mustached-one (Stalin) will not let them.*”⁶

The involvement of the Soviets and their Eastern European satellites in supporting the EAM also became very apparent. In December 1945, members of the KKE Central Committee met with various communist Bulgarian and Yugoslav officers. The Greek Communists were assured that they could use Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia as bases. In December 1947, the Yugoslavs provided 10,000 troops to assist the Greek Communists. After 1949, the Greek Communist forces retreated to Romania, the USSR, and Bulgaria. At least 28,000 Greek children were kidnapped by the communists between 1946 and 1948. They were taken to Albania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Poland for indoctrination.⁷ In July 1944, a Soviet Military Mission was attached to the ELAS forces. The head of the Mission Lt. Col. Grigorii Popov was welcomed by the Communists. The Soviets were popular with ELAS. By the late 1940s, the EAM/ELAS became the Greek Democratic Army (GDA). By 1948, the Soviets established supply lines to the GDA through Albania. In July 1948, three Soviet ships unloaded weapons at the Albanian port of Durazzo. These weapons were destined for GDA supply depots at Korce. The Soviets even set up a military factory to produce arms for the GDA. By the end of the late 1940s, the communists provided 1,000 cannons, anti-tank guns, and antiaircraft guns and over 1 million shells to the GDA. The Soviets recruited 8,000 Greeks in

⁴ Stevens, John Melior; Montague Woodhouse, Christopher; Wallace, David John; Baerentzen, Lars. British Reports on Greece 1943-1944 (Museum Tusculanum Press: Copenhagen Denmark 1982) page 53.

⁵ “Communist Party of Greece” Accessed From:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communist_Party_of_Greece#KKE_during_the_Second_World_War

⁶ “Communist Party of Greece” Accessed From:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communist_Party_of_Greece#1940

⁷ Courtois, Stephane; Werth, Nicolas; Panne, Jean-Louis; Paczkowski, Andrzej; Bartosek, Karel. The Black Book of Communism Accessed From:
<http://archive.org/details/TheBlackBookofCommunism10>

the West to fight with the GDA.⁸ GDA forces also acquired abandoned weapons from abandoned or captured positions formerly held by Greek Nationalist Forces (Army). As the Greek Civil War progressed, its communist neighbors supplied machine guns, mortars, artillery, heavy mortars, anti-aircraft and antitank guns, and flamethrowers to the GDA forces. In the winter of 1948, UN and Greek government observers found Soviet and Eastern European-made weapons in GDA positions. Previously GDA forces were equipped with captured Italian, British, and German-made arms. According to GDA defectors, the Soviet bloc indicated that they would supply the Greek Communists with tanks, airplanes, artillery, and anti-aircraft guns. In 1949, Greek forces captured GDA weapons during Operation Torch. Captured weapons included artillery guns, anti-aircraft weapons, mortars, machine guns, and other firearms. By 1947-1948, the GDA possessed Skoda 75 mm howitzers and Soviet 120 mm mortars. By 1949, GDA forces retained 15 105 mm howitzers and 45 75 mm field guns. Albanian, Yugoslav, and Bulgarian vehicles were used to transport weapons to the GDA. Wounded GDA soldiers and officers were evacuated to Bulgaria, Albania, and Yugoslavia, and other communist countries and the USSR.⁹ By 1950, the Greek Communists were defeated by the nationalist government.

The *Sendero Luminoso* (Shining Path) was a Maoist Communist group whose leaders were originally provided military and political training in Red China during the 1960s and 1970s. The Shining Path sought to create a “*New Democratic Republic*” for Peru. Upon seizing complete power, the Shining Path would nationalize all private enterprise in Peru. All vestiges of social or economic rank would be eliminated through “*popular education*.” Those who are unable to cope with the new system would be executed. “*Popular committees*” and “*support bases*” would be created to consolidate Shining Path power in Peru. The Shining Path grew and smuggled cocaine. Shining Path leaders noted that much of their cocaine exports to the United States resulted in the corrosion and demoralization of the “*Yankee imperialists*.” The Shining Path also ensured cocaine growers a disciplined labor force that was tightly controlled. The Shining Path also designated certain individuals to be allowed to engage in foreign currency exchanges. Unlike most of the other communist guerrilla groups, the Shining Path appeared to have no foreign communist supporters either in the Soviet Union, China, or any of their allies.¹⁰

Some Cold War-era communist insurgencies continue to this day. One example is the rebellion of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Since its inception, FARC was backed by the communist bloc. FARC also established territorial footholds in Colombia where it governed in a cruel, totalitarian fashion. Six FARC deserters revealed in August 1987 that various FARC fronts have Cuban advisers attached to them. Other deserters reported that Cubans also are working as advisers and instructors for the National Liberation Army (ELN) and are directing its ecologically and economically disastrous sabotage of oil installations.¹¹ FARC commanders sent their soldiers to the USSR and Vietnam for military training. Similar to the Shining Path and other communist movements, FARC utilized cocaine production and

⁸ Stavrakis, Peter J. Moscow and Greek Communism, 1944-1949 (Cornell University Press Ithaca NY 1989) page 29.

⁹ Ibid, pages 159-200.

¹⁰ Tarazona-Sevillano, Gabriela. Sendero Luminoso and the Threat of Narcoterrorism (Praeger, 1990)

¹¹ Hudson, Rex. Castro's America Department: Coordinating Cuba's Support for Marxist-Leninist Violence in the Americas Cuban American National Foundation 1988 Accessed From: <http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/rex-hudson.htm>

smuggling as tool to raise hard currency and weaken the social fabric of the United States. Coca revenue flooded the FARC's Financial Commission starting in the 1980s. A military academy was set up to prepare FARC troops for a command structure and investments were made in the FARC's command, control, and communications systems. Hence, FARC developed the nucleus of a future regular army in the event of their complete conquest of Colombia.¹²

In the event that various Latin American communist groups seized power in Central and South America, FARC would receive increased support. Colombia would be surrounded by communist revolutionary states and overpowered. These revolutions were funded by the proceeds of drug production and smuggling. Robert Workman reported on an interview conducted with a US citizen who was kidnapped and held for ransom by the Colombian communist FARC terrorists. This kidnapped citizen reported that *"The FARC, M-19, and Ejercito Popular de Liberacion (EPL) are all really consolidated; they are really one family controlled by Cuba.... I was in their camp when a Cuban was at a blackboard instructing some guerrillas. One of the guerrillas asked him: 'What happens to all of this money? You control the drug-traffic, you're taking in millions of dollars, and I don't see any money in our camp. They just give us bare necessities. You get food, clothes, and shells for your rifle and you do not get anything else.' The Cuban adviser's answer was that one half of the money was being sent to El Salvador. That we are liberating El Salvador. When El Salvador is liberated, then they will turn around and...using the economies of El Salvador, Nicaragua and Cuba...funnel funds into Colombia and help us, so we can overthrow the government here."*¹³

The Venezuelan communist dictatorship of Hugo Chavez and Nicolas Maduro funneled support to the FARC in Colombia. Venezuela maintained a terrorist training camp in cooperation with Cuban soldiers. FARC guerrillas were enrolled in six week training courses open for 400 to 1,000 participants. FARC trainers at this camp also instructed Venezuelan armed forces reserve "squad leaders" in the arts of asymmetric warfare.¹⁴ Cuba continued to serve as a major sponsor of FARC. In 2002, the former FARC commander Tiro-Fijo admitted that *"Thanks to Fidel Castro...we are now a powerful army, not a hit and run band."* FARC continued to maintain an office in Havana Cuba. FARC officers also conferred with Cuban Intelligence (DI) about various issues and challenges. According to Colombian intelligence, one FARC officer reportedly *"receives a \$5,000 monthly stipend through the Cuban bank account of a Venezuelan government office."*¹⁵ The Russian Federation through the "mafia" also provided a submarine and anti-aircraft missiles to the FARC, while Baathist Socialist Syria shipped captured American-made Stinger and Redeye SAMs.¹⁶ Venezuela also pledged \$300 million to the FARC. The Venezuelans also proposed oil rations to FARC, which could then be exported for a profit.

¹² Cook, Thomas R. "The Financial Arm of the FARC" Journal of Strategic Security Spring 2011 Accessed From: <http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1072&context=jss>

¹³ Douglass, Joseph D. Red Cocaine (Clarion House, 1990) page 231.

¹⁴ Casto Ocando. "Cuba, FARC may be training guerrillas at Venezuelan camp" The Miami Herald October 4, 2008 Accessed From: <http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/farc/camp-venezuela.htm>

¹⁵ Fontova, Humberto. "The Cuba Embargo Has Actually Worked Like a Charm" The Blaze January 2, 2015 Accessed From: <http://www.theblaze.com/contributions/the-cuba-embargo-has-actually-worked-like-a-charm-2/>

¹⁶ Villa, Robert. "IRA/Cuban/Venezuelan Involvement in Colombia" Cubanet August 20, 2001 Accessed From: <http://www.cubanet.org/htdocs/CNews/y01/ago01/20e4.htm>

Chavez also pledged that Venezuelan army officers would supply arms to FARC through arms dealers and stores of military weapons held in reserve.¹⁷ FARC also engaged in “*revolutionary internationalism*” when it channeled funds to the socialist Rafael Correa, who became president of Ecuador in 2007.¹⁸

Moscow’s neighbors were subjected to heavy subversion campaign. One well-known case was Afghanistan. In April 1978, communist elements in the Afghan military seized power and overthrew the leftwing president Mohammed Daoud. The communist party which infiltrated the Afghan armed forces and government was the Soviet-funded People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). From the start, the USSR controlled the PDPA through direction and subsidies. A former Afghan Minister of the Interior noted that PDPA leaders were “*controlled, subsidized, paid, and ordered directly by KGB elements of the Soviet Embassy.*” In 1982, defecting Soviet KGB major Vladimir Kuzichkin reported that the future PDPA leader and puppet president Babrak Karmal was “*a KGB agent for many years. He could be relied upon to accept our advice.*” A Ministry of Education senior official recalled this about the pre-1978 communist penetration of the government: “*They were everywhere.*” The former governor of Herat Province G.A. Ayeen noted that the provincial police chief, 10% of teachers, and the provincial education chief were all communists. A Ministry of Water and Power official reported that communists made up 10% of his ministry. A former senior Ministry of Planning official believed that 5% of his ministry’s employees were communists and many more secret party members.¹⁹

Upon seizing power, the PDPA and their foreign communist supporters engaged in ruthless brutality towards the opposition. Apparently, they also retained long-term, genocidal plans directed at the Afghan populace. In 1979, the Commandant of Pul-i-Charkhi Prison Sayyed Abdullah noted: “*One million Afghans only should remain alive. We don’t need Islamic groups, we don’t need merchants, we don’t need capitalists, we need one million Communists. The others we don’t need, so we’ll get rid of them!*”²⁰

After the April 1978 military coup, Soviet and other foreign communist troops poured into Afghanistan to assist the PDPA regime. By the end of 1979, Afghanistan hosted 3,500 to 4,000 Soviet troops. After December 1979, Soviet troop levels approached the 100,000 mark. Various bloc and Third World countries dispatched troops to assist the Soviets in their occupation of Afghanistan. It was reported in 1985 that Cuban, East German, and Bulgarian troops sent logistics and support units to help Soviet and Afghan forces. It was reported that Bulgarian forces guarded the Kabul-Jalalabad Road.²¹ A Vietnamese Army officer who defected to Thailand in 1984 informed reporters that he was one of 208 PAVN²² troops sent to

¹⁷ “The FARC Files” The Economist May 22, 2008 Accessed From: <http://www.economist.com/node/11412645>

¹⁸ Westerman, Toby. “The Web of Terror” March 19, 2008 Accessed From: http://www.traditioninaction.org/HotTopics/i70htWesterman_FARC_Threat_Westerman.html

¹⁹ Amstutz, J. Bruce. Afghanistan: The First Five Years of Soviet Occupation (NDU Press, 1986) Accessed From: <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a187795.pdf>

²⁰ Cate, Curtis. Afghanistan: The Terrible Decade 1978-1988 (American Foundation for Resistance International, 1988) pages 13-14.

²¹ “E. European, Cuban Troops Reportedly Aiding Kabul” London Press Association June 20, 1985

²² PAVN was the acronym for the People’s Army of Vietnam.

Afghanistan.²³ Defecting engineer Abdur Rahmin reported that Vietnamese troops guarded Kabul International Airport.²⁴ Two Ariana Airlines pilots, Abdul Rakhman and Habibollah Balkhi, claimed that Cuban, Czechoslovak, and South Yemeni troops flew into Afghanistan to assist the Afghan and Soviets. They also claimed that East German soldiers guarded the Shindad airbase.²⁵ Two hundred troops from the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK-Cambodia) were also allegedly sent to Afghanistan to assist their masters in Moscow. This information was brought to the attention of the West by a defecting PRK commander/captain named Nong Lan.²⁶ Four hundred troops of the Korean People's Army (North Korean army) reportedly fought alongside Soviet and Afghan forces.²⁷ A defecting Afghan Army officer noted that Bulgarian troops were based in southern Mazar-e Sharif to protect the fuel pipeline to Sheberghan. East German Stasi advisers provided training to the Afghan secret police and intelligence agency, AGSA/KAM/Khad/WAD.²⁸ Five thousand Cuban and Czechoslovak pilots also advised the Afghan air force during this period. Cuban troops were also present in Afghanistan and fought fiercely against the anti-Soviet rebels. One guerrilla described the Cuban forces as *"big and black and shout very loudly when they fight. Unlike the Russians they were not afraid to attack us in the open."*²⁹ A leader of the Islamic Front movement claimed that 10,000 Cuban troops were airlifted to Afghanistan. The Cubans fought alongside Czechoslovak, Bulgarian, and Romanian troops.³⁰ Hazbe Islami Commander Sanagul also noted that 1,200 Cuban paratroopers were dropped into Qarghaie district in eastern Afghanistan and surrounded 15 villages. Civilians and suspected rebels were forcibly trapped in their homes and burned alive.³¹

The Soviets and the Warsaw Pact also engaged in a training program to nurture a new generation of Afghan communist leaders and secret agents. In 1981, it was estimated that 5,500 Afghans received military training in the USSR and Eastern Europe. In 1982, a captured Afghan boy soldier revealed that the USSR trained Afghan children to be spies and saboteurs. Hundreds

²³ Amstutz, J. Bruce. Afghanistan: The First Five Years of Soviet Occupation (NDU Press, 1986) Accessed From: <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a187795.pdf>

²⁴ Lyngve, Erland. "Defectors Describe Afghanistan Under Soviets" United Press International March 14, 1983

²⁵ "Many Workers for Afghan Airline Defect to the West" New York Times September 16, 1980 page 3.

²⁶ "PRK Defector Tells of Troops Sent to Afghanistan and Chinese Border" BBC Summary of World Broadcasts June 18, 1984

²⁷ "Pyongyang Radio Denounces Report on N Korean Troops in Afghanistan" BBC Summary of World Broadcasts May 4, 1987

²⁸ Under the communists, the Afghan secret police was renamed Afghanistan Interests Safeguarding Administration (AGSA) under Taraki, Workers Intelligence Institute (KAM) under Amin, the State Information Service (Khad) under Karmal, and the Ministry of State Security under Najibullah.

²⁹ Nyrop, Richard F. and Seekins, Donald M. Afghanistan Country Study (Foreign Area Studies The American University 1986) Accessed From: <http://www.gi.iit.edu/govdocs/afghanistan/index.html>

³⁰ "10,000 Cuban Troops in Afghanistan, Rebels Say" Christian Science Monitor September 5, 1980 page 2.

³¹ "Cubans Aided Soviet Executions in Afghanistan, Rebel Chief Says" Akron Beacon Journal May 6, 1985 page 1.

of children took three month military courses at the Soviet base in Samarkand. The boy was adept at using submachine guns, throwing hand grenades, and creeping up on the enemy. KHAD agents were sent to the Soviet Union, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria for training.³² Former prisoners from Pul-e-Charkhi prison reportedly saw Soviet KGB and East German Stasi personnel present during interrogations. Former prisoners reportedly witnessed East European “*observers*” visiting Pul-e-Charkhi Prison.³³

The communist Afghans and the pro-Soviet Indians sought to potentially dismember Islamist and anti-communist Pakistan. In 1978, Foreign Minister Hafizullah Amin was recalled as requesting from Indian Foreign Minister Atar Bihari Vajpayee that “*let us have a secret pact; you take one part of Pakistan and we take the other part.*”

The Soviets also sought to dismember Afghanistan as a means of gaining a strategic springboard to Red China and Islamist Pakistan. By the fall of 1980, Soviet troops directly took over the Wakhan Corridor in Afghanistan. It was also reported in 1981 that an Afghan border area called Morichaq was taken over by the USSR. The Soviets banned Afghans from entering the area. In December 1981, senior KHAD official Lt General Saddiq Ghulam Miraki defected and claimed that the Soviets tendered a proposal to Babrak Karmal to annex the eight northern Afghan provinces. Brezhnev proposed that the northern Afghan provinces would become a Soviet Republic and the rest of the Afghanistan would become a buffer state. This proposal was violently opposed by the Khalqi faction at a 1982 PDPA Congress.³⁴

The first Afghan communist ruler Nur Mohammed Taraki (1978-1979) called for a “*jihad*” against those who he designated as false Muslims or “*Ikhwanu Shayateen*.” These false Muslims opposed the communist takeover of Afghanistan. The Shah’s Iran was the target of a Soviet effort to destabilize that friendly government in the Persian Gulf region. Afghanistan was a key participant in the Soviet effort to subvert the Shah’s Iran. Once Taraki took over Afghanistan, Soviet-trained agents moved into Iran and infiltrated mosques, schools, Shiite monasteries, bazaars, and oil fields. By November 1978, there were an estimated 500,000 illegal Afghan immigrants in Iran. The KGB set up large training camps in Afghanistan for Iranian terrorists.³⁵ It was estimated that 800 to 1,000 Tudeh Party and *Fedayeen Khalq* members were training in Kabul Afghanistan. Soviets of Tadzhik and Uzbek origin and Cuban officers were involved in the training of these terrorists and Tudeh members.³⁶

The Soviet-controlled Afghan foreign intelligence (*Estekbarat*) coordinated activities among the 500,000 Afghans who resided in Iran. Soviet weapons destined for rebels in Iranian Baluchistan were transshipped through communist Afghanistan. Two Soviet-controlled camps in Afghanistan provided communist indoctrination and terrorist training to Pakistani and Iranian radical leftists. During the anti-Shah demonstrations of 1978, the Iranian authorities arrested Afghans. In January 1979, 200 armed men crossed the border from Afghanistan, according to former Iranian Prime Minister Shahpour Bakhtiar. Phillips observed that there was a

³² Amstutz, J. Bruce. Afghanistan: The First Five Years of Soviet Occupation (NDU Press, 1986) Accessed From: <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a187795.pdf>

³³ Girardet, Edward. Afghanistan: The Soviet War (Routledge, 2012) page 122.

³⁴ Amstutz, J. Bruce. Afghanistan: The First Five Years of Soviet Occupation (NDU Press, 1986) Accessed From: <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a187795.pdf>

³⁵ Rees, John. “How Jimmy Carter Betrayed the Shah” The Review of the News February 21, 1979 pages 31-48.

³⁶ “Soviets Training Guerillas” Voice of Iran September 25, 1981

*“historically close working relationship...between Afghanistan’s Khalq Party and the pro-Soviet Iranian Tudeh Party...”*³⁷

The PDPA also attempted to forge an alliance with Islamist Iran under the common ideology of anti-Americanism. In January 1980, the puppet government of Babrak Karmal formulated a letter addressed to Iranian ruler Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. The letter noted that Afghanistan *“will never allow anybody to use our soil as a base against the Islamic revolution of Iran...and we expect our Iranian brethren to assume a reciprocal stance.”*³⁸ In March 1980, the Lebanese publication As-Safir reported Babrak Karmal communicated via the PLO a desire to become allies with Islamist Iran.³⁹

Afghanistan under PDPA rule became a major supporter for leftwing Pakistani terrorists, the PLO, and its *“splinters.”* In 1973, Soviet arms were found in the Iraqi Embassy in Islamabad. These weapons were provided to Baluchi and Pathan separatists in Pakistan. Pakistan claimed that the Soviets and East Europeans sent weapons to the Baluchi rebels through Afghanistan before 1976.⁴⁰ The science and engineering divisions of Kabul University were transformed into terrorist training centers, attended by mostly ethnic Baluchis from Pakistan, Iranians of various parties, Palestinians, Syrians, Libyans, and Yemenis. The PLO established an office in Kabul early on in PDPA rule. In 1981, a PFLP representative pinned a medal on Babrak Karmal. The Pakistani leftist terrorist group *Al-Zulfikar* originally maintained its headquarters in Kabul. They relocated later to New Delhi and Libya. *Al-Zulfikar* maintained offices in South Yemen, Afghanistan, and Libya. *Al-Zulfikar* students were also sent to the USSR for advanced training.⁴¹

Afghan embassies and missions in London, Washington DC, Paris, and New York City linked up with various subversive groups. KHAD agents based at Afghan Embassies pressured Afghan refugees in Europe and the United States to refrain from anti-communist activities. These KHAD agents worked under the guise of refugees and resistance supporters.⁴²

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union had ambitious plans for their Afghan puppet communists in Kabul. The PDPA government in Afghanistan positioned itself very firmly in the Soviet military camp and enthusiastically supported communist expansion in the world. The Afghan PDPA even volunteered its army for Soviet conquest plans in the Persian Gulf. This was most apparent when Afghan Minister of Defense Abdul Qader stated in 1982 that: *“In the future the Afghan Army will play a significant role like that of the Cuban and Vietnamese Armies...not far away is the day when our army will become a strong and energetic army capable of defending peace and security not only in Afghanistan, but in the region as well.”*⁴³ In 1980, Afghan military Brigadier

³⁷ Phillips, James. “Afghanistan: The Soviet Quagmire” The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder October 25, 1979 Accessed From: <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/1979/10/afghanistan-the-soviet-quagmire>

³⁸ Branigin, William. “Afghan Leader Claims Common Cause With Iran” Washington Post January 17, 1980 page A20.

³⁹ “Karmal’s approach to PLO over relations with Iran” Qatar News Agency April 3, 1980

⁴⁰ Golan, Galia. The Soviet Union and National Liberation Movements in the Third World (Unwin Hyman 1988).

⁴¹ Klass, Rosanne. Afghanistan: The Great Game Revisited (Freedom House 1990) pages 12-13.

⁴² Ibid, pages 19-20.

⁴³ Amstutz, J. Bruce. Afghanistan: The First Five Years of Soviet Occupation (NDU Press, 1986) Accessed From: <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a187795.pdf>

Qader noted *“We do not interfere in the domestic affairs of any other state because any state is free to handle its own affairs. On the other hand, as a Party and a state we support, and will continue to support, the world’s liberation movements struggling for just causes.”*⁴⁴ Babrak Karmal stated in 1981 that *“Our army will become a strong and energetic army capable of defending peace and security not only in Afghanistan but in the region as well.”*⁴⁵ Roseanne Klass believed that the Soviets would use the leftist separatist group Baluchi People’s Liberation Front (BPLF) and special units of the Afghan Armed Forces in an invasion plan to occupy the Persian Gulf.⁴⁶

Despite the rhetoric of *“proletarian internationalism,”* the Soviets also exploited occupied Afghanistan in a colonial fashion. In a 1985 speech to the PDPA, President Babrak Karmal described Afghan gas field workers toiling in abysmal working conditions. These workers resided in caves and lacked adequate food, clothing, and shoes. They were described as slave laborers who worked under the guise of volunteers. The exports of this gas were sent to the Soviet Union. In November 1986, Yuri Ganovsky, head of the Near and Middle East Department of the Institute of Oriental Studies in the Soviet Academy of Sciences, admitted that the USSR exploited Afghanistan for its resources: *“We are paid for everything we are sending to Afghanistan. All our expenses-I state ‘all’ twice are paid by Afghanistan...There is a giant gas field in the northern part of Afghanistan, and by supplying the gas Afghanistan is paying us for everything...Afghanistan is supplying us not only with gas...but also with fruit, with skins and agriculture, cotton.”* Many costs for the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan were also borne by Soviet allies such as East Germany, Cuba, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia, and since 1985, Poland.⁴⁷

In 1967, the British withdrew from their colony in southern Yemen and turned over governing authority to the communists of the National Liberation Front (NLF). By 1969, the NLF renamed itself the National Front, which by the mid-1970s transformed itself into the Yemen Socialist Party (YSP). As soon as the British withdrew their administrators and troops, foreign communist forces from the USSR, Red China, Cuba, and East Germany moved in. British-held Yemen became the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) until 1990, when the north and south were unified into a single nation.

However, in the interim, South Yemen became a springboard for communist revolution in the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa. Sometimes South Yemen even projected its forces outside those two regions in the interests of global communism. South Yemen reportedly dispatched troops and People’s Militia forces to Chad, Afghanistan, and Ethiopia to protect Soviet satellite governments in these countries.⁴⁸

South Yemen also engaged in subversion and assassinations in the Arabian Peninsula. South Yemeni agents were dispatched to foment strikes at the refineries and oilfields in Abadan Iran in the late 1970s.⁴⁹ South Yemeni agents reportedly attempted to kill or actually murdered

⁴⁴ “Brig Qader interviewed by Beirut paper” *As-Safir* April 17, 1980

⁴⁵ Klass, Rosanne. *Afghanistan: The Great Game Revisited* (Freedom House 1990) page 272.

⁴⁶ *Ibid*, page 271.

⁴⁷ *Ibid*.

⁴⁸ “Yemeni Nationalists Quoted on PDRY Troops Abroad” *MENA* December 23, 1980

⁴⁹ Phillips, James. “Afghanistan: The Soviet Quagmire” The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder October 25, 1979 Accessed From: <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/1979/10/afghanistan-the-soviet-quagmire>

dissidents and defectors in places such as Cairo and Beirut. The South Yemeni representative in Bahrain was believed to have been involved in the murder of a right-wing newspaper editor. It was suspected that the South Yemen representative was involved in the plotting of this murder.⁵⁰

One of South Yemen's primary targets for revolution was the non-communist regime in the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR). In 1968, South Yemen provided bases and arms for the Revolutionary Democratic Party (RDP), whose purpose was to "*restore the revolution in Sana.*" In 1971 and 1972, RDP guerrilla operations in the YAR were buttressed by invading forces from the South Yemeni armed forces, which were equipped with modern Soviet arms.⁵¹

In early 1976, the National Democratic Front (NDF) was formed as a force allied to South Yemen. The NDF was formed as a coalition of leftist and communist groups: The RDP and the Organization of Yemeni Resisters were basically branches of the PDRY regime; the Popular Democratic Union and the Popular Vanguard Party were the North Yemen branches of the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party; and the Labor Party was a North Yemeni group which consisted of Marxists, ex-Baathists, and remnants of militias who fought with the pro-Soviet, pro-Egypt republican governments in the YAR. The NDF sought to create a "*national democratic state*," where the economy was under national and state control. It supported the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO) in Oman and called for greater cooperation between the YAR and PDRY. The NDF also supported closer relations between the YAR and the "*socialist countries*."⁵²

The South Yemeni communists and their allies in Beijing and Moscow also played an important role in fomenting revolution in the Omani province of Dhofar. In Dhofar, a separatist communist group called the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO) battled the pro-British and pro-American government of Sultan Qabus. The Soviet Union, Red China, and South Yemen all provided massive amounts of training, troops, and arms to the PFLO from the 1960s until well into the 1980s.

A PFLO defector named Salim Amir noted that while he was trained in the USSR, he learned the art of military science alongside groups from South America, Cambodia, Vietnam, and Africa. He was told that the Soviet Army would make massive use of tanks, armored vehicles, and nuclear and biological weapons in its invasion of West Germany and beyond. Communist successes in France, Italy, West Germany, and Britain were also cited by Soviet instructors as positive examples of the inevitable victory of global communism. In 1968, a PFLO recruiting cell was set up in noncommunist forces such as the Trucial Omani Scouts. Two Trucial Omani Scout corporals were secret PFLO agents. They collected a portion of the soldiers' monthly pay and remitted the money to the PFLO office in Kuwait. They also secretly recruited Omani soldiers to the PFLO by requesting British officers for leave. The new PFLO recruits would then secretly disappear from Oman and travel to the USST for training. A PFLO defector named Ahmed Deblaan traveled to South Yemen in 1968. He then traveled to Karachi on Middle East Airways. Deblaan then flew to Shanghai in Red China on Pakistan Airways and then onto Peking on Chinese Airways. These PFLO agents were lodged in luxury hotels and

⁵⁰ Bidwell, Robin. The Two Yemens (Longman, 1983) page 300.

⁵¹ Ahmed Noman Almadhagi. Yemen and the USA: A Super-Power and a Small-state Relationship, 1962-1992 (I.B.Tauris, 1996) page 89.

⁵² Halliday, Fred. Revolution and Foreign Policy: The Case of South Yemen, 1967-1987 (Cambridge University Press, 2002) page 121.

were shown historical sights. They trained at a school in Red China alongside North Koreans and Africans. The PFLO agents learned how to use artillery, rockets, and small arms.⁵³

Soviet journalists visited PFLO held areas beginning in 1969. The Soviets channeled arms to the PFLO through South Yemen. The Soviet Navy also transported South Yemeni troops and arms to the Omani border. The Cuban forces in South Yemen trained the PFLO. Qaddafi's Libya and Baathist Iraq also provided the PFLO with weapons.⁵⁴

According to Omani ruler Sultan Qabus, there were still 200-300 PFLO rebels as of 1976. The remaining PFLO rebels were based in South Yemen and trained by the USSR, North Korea, and Cuba. By October 1977, the last PFLO units surrendered to the Sultan's forces. After 1977, the PFLO was based in the PDRY and its leaders were funded and controlled by the South Yemeni government.⁵⁵ As late as 1984, the PFLO was still supported by the Soviets, according to Omani government sources.⁵⁶

In the mid-1960s, the People's National Congress (PNC) and its leader Forbes Burnham took over newly independent Guyana. Burnham was perceived by the United States and Great Britain as being less leftwing than his rival, the arch-Stalinist Cheddi Jagan of the People's Progressive Party (PPP). Burnham was much more adept at hiding his Marxism-Leninism for the purpose of the strategic deception of the British and the Americans. Cuban DGI official and Head of the Americas Department (DA) Manuel Pineiro noted that Burnham embarked on an "*anti-imperialist course*" and shared "*some of the ideas of Marxism Leninism, but for tactical reasons is forced to conceal this.*"⁵⁷ The major players in the Guyanese Left also launched a united front. In 1976, the PNC and PPP launched a rapprochement, with the PPP providing "*critical support*" to Burnham. Cuban DA officials also trained cadres of the Working Peoples' Alliance (WPA), which was formed in 1973.⁵⁸

Burnham supported communist revolutionaries worldwide, including funding for southern African terrorists since 1970. Starting in 1975, Guyana provided Cuban planes with landing rights at Timehri airport en route to Africa. In 1976, Cheddi Jagan called upon Burnham to invite Cuban troops to Guyana to guard against "*aggression*" from Venezuela. Burnham received aid from Red China, as well.

Despite the Sino-Soviet "*split*," Zhu Liang of the CCP International Liaison Department and a Soviet delegate attended the Fourth Congress of the PNC in 1981.

In March 1978, Cuban General Senen Casas Regueiro met with Brig. Clarence Price, chief of staff of the Guyana Defense Force (GDF). Four hundred Cuban troops trained the forces of the GDF. In February 1983, two unmarked ships docked in Guyana and unloaded artillery and small arms at the Linden Alumina plant wharf. The GDF had Soviet-made mortars and artillery,

⁵³ Greig, Ian. The Communist Challenge to Africa (Foreign Affairs Publishing Co., 1977) pages 143-147.

⁵⁴ Golan, Galia. The Soviet Union and National Liberation Movements in the Third World (Unwin Hyman 1988)

⁵⁵ Aryeh Yodfat. The Soviet Union and the Arabian Peninsula (RLE Iran A) (Taylor & Francis, 2012) page 43.

⁵⁶ Golan, Galia. The Soviet Union and National Liberation Movements in the Third World (Unwin Hyman 1988)

⁵⁷ Mitrokhin, Vassili and Andrew, Christopher. The World Was Going Our Way (Basic Books, 2005) page 102.

⁵⁸ Ashby, Timothy. The Bear in the Backyard (Lexington Books, 1987) pages 143-151.

armed North Korean-made patrol boats, and Soviet-made Mi-8 helicopters. In 1985, Romania signed an agreement with Guyana to provide training for GDF pilots.⁵⁹

After Burnham passed away in the mid-1980s, his successor Desmond Hoyte and Prime Minister Hamilton Green embarked on Gorbachev-style reforms which preserved the political totalitarian rule of the PNC, while opening Guyana up to increased foreign investment. Such investments by Western multinationals served to increase Guyana's political legitimacy and opened its economy up to new technologies and sources of funding. Hoyte noted that his negotiations with IMF did not mean that the PNC softened its position on its Marxism. Instead, Hoyte remarked that the IMF softened its position *vis a vis* the PNC. Hoyte noted that he was undertaking a perestroika in Guyana and that there was no shift in Guyanese policies. Hoyte further noted that "*our party is a socialist party as stated in the very first article of the party's constitution.*" Hoyte also noted that "*modification of method*" was important and was not "*abandonment of basic goals.*"⁶⁰ In August 1987, President Hoyte noted that the PNC "*Our party is a socialist party...It was clear that because of the nature of our society, socialism in Guyana would have to follow an innovative course, would have to bear the imprint of an unmistakable Guyanese image and would have to take account of the distinctive features of our national life.*"⁶¹ He also noted that "*...socialism in Guyana would have to follow an innovative course; would have to bear the imprint of an unmistakable Guyanese image; and would have to take account of the distinctive features of our national life.*"⁶² Prime Minister Green noted in 1989 that "*Private enterprise doesn't conflict with socialism. We need large inputs of money, and we hope the IMF program will provide incentives needed to grow.*"⁶³

Hoyte noted that the alleged "*shift*" of the PNC did not "*...represent a change of direction, but rather a different style of leadership.*" The Yearbook of International Communist Affairs noted "*...it could be argued that cultivating a new image is a tactical device to revive the economy in preparation for completing a socialist agenda.*"⁶⁴ The Yearbook of International Communist noted in 1989 that "*the PNC retained its authoritarian grip on the government and all repressive sectors of the state.*"⁶⁵

It seemed that the PNC and PPP utilized the strategy of the Leninist ideological "*retreat*" and repositioning to preserve Marxist rule in Guyana. The PPP and PNC still paid ideological homage to the concept of Marxism-Leninism. In late 1989, Jagan also noted that he and the PPP "*stood firmly behind the forces of democracy and renewal in socialist Europe as it has always stood for democracy in Latin America, Guyana, and other parts of the world.*"⁶⁶ In December

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Staar, Richard F. Yearbook on International Communist Affairs 1987 (Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University., 1987) pages 85-86.

⁶¹ "Hoyte Speaks on Ideology at PNC Congress" Bridgetown CANA August 11, 1987

⁶² Hoyte, Desmond. People's National Congress, Congress 1987 Address (Government National Printers 1987), page 11.

⁶³ Information Services on Latin America (ISLA) Volume 38 1989 page 205.

⁶⁴ Staar, Richard F. Yearbook on International Communism 1986 (Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University., 1986) pages 101-103.

⁶⁵ Staar, Richard F. Yearbook on International Communist Affairs 1990 (Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University., 1990) pages 94-95.

⁶⁶ Staar, Richard F. Yearbook on International Communist Affairs (Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University) pages 91-93.

1989, PPP head Cheddi Jagan noted that the so-called reforms of the PNC, the Soviets, and the Red Chinese “are clearly intended to build a democratic and humane socialism.”⁶⁷ In late 1989, Jagan of the PPP noted “We are not renouncing our beliefs. Marxism Leninism is a working class ideology... We are wedded to liberating the working people.”⁶⁸ In November 1990, Jagan noted that the PPP would follow “a democratic, anti-imperialist and socialist course.”⁶⁹ Yet it was questionable whether the “reforms” truly took root in the domestic Guyanese economy. As of August 1990, the PNC-controlled Guyanese state still owned about 75% of the economy.⁷⁰

American capitalists and politicians (even “conservatives”) were duped into thinking that freer forms of economy were taking root in Guyana. Other American multinationals saw quick profits in economic cooperation with the PNC dictatorship. In June 1989, Hoyte toured the United States as a tool to promote US private investment in Guyana. Hoyte also met with Secretary of State James Baker, where he noted that the US was willing to aid Guyana. Some key Democrats pressed the Bush Administration to address totalitarian rule of the PNC and to link US aid with human rights improvements.⁷¹ However, the Bush Administration ignored the pleas of this select group of Democrats. In late 1990, Cheddi Jagan espoused the benefits of foreign investment and private enterprise to foreign journalists and visiting delegations. In the US, the primary lobbying targets of the PPP were the White House, Congress, and the American business community. In December 1990, Jagan lobbied the Bush Administration, Congress, the business community in Miami, and the Republican Party’s Elephant Forum.⁷²

After 1985, the Guyanese continued to maintain close relations with the communist world. At the Sixth PNC Party Congress of 1985, PNC Secretary General Ranji Chandisingh noted “Guyana’s continued progress along the road of socialist restructuring...and noted the importance of strengthening party ties between the PNC, the CPSU, and the communist parties of Cuba and the other socialist countries.”⁷³ Guyana had political and party-to-party exchanges with Cuba, the USSR, North Korea, and East Germany. In August 1988, the 7th Biennial Congress of the PNC hosted delegations from the USSR, East Germany, Cuba, Poland, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, North Korea, Iraq, the PLO, and the ANC.⁷⁴ Hoyte, Prime Minister Green, and other PNC officials visited Cuba and China. The Speaker of the PNC-controlled Guyanese National Assembly Sase Narain visited Red China in the wake of the Tiananmen Square massacre. He remarked that “I believe the Chinese government can make correct judgments of its internal affairs and do things in line with the interest of the people.” In August 1989, the PNC Eight Biennial Congress hosted 2,000 delegates from North Korea, Romania, Zimbabwe,

⁶⁷ “Marxist Leader Welcomes Changes in East Europe” Bridgetown CANA December 8, 1989

⁶⁸ Staar, Richard F. Yearbook on International Communist Affairs (Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University) pages 91-93.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ “Guyana: CDB Assistance for Electricity Generation System” IPS-Inter Press Service August 24, 1990

⁷¹ Staar, Richard F. Yearbook on International Communist Affairs (Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University) pages 94-95.

⁷² Staar, Richard F. Yearbook on International Communist Affairs 1990 (Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University., 1990) pages 91-93.

⁷³ Ashby, Timothy. The Bear in the Backyard (Lexington Books, 1987) pages 143-151.

⁷⁴ Staar, Richard F. Yearbook on International Communist Affairs 1987 (Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University 1987)

Mozambique, Cuba, East Germany, USSR, Yugoslavia, China, the ANC, SWAPO, and the PLO.⁷⁵ By 1990, the communist states cut back their assistance and trade with PNC-ruled Guyana. No doubt, Moscow and Beijing saw that the West and the Americans were more than willing to step in and subsidize yet another communist dictatorship through trade and loans. Throughout the year 1990, the Soviets greatly reduced trade with Guyana. Red China provided \$6 million in credits and two small loans during 1990. In June 1990, the Guyanese and Cubans had friendly party-to-party meetings, while trade was greatly reduced between those two nations.⁷⁶

In August-September 1974, the Ethiopian army overthrew Emperor Haile Selassie and established a dictatorial junta called the *Dergue*. By late 1974, communists around Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam and General Teferi Bante gained the upper hand and moved Ethiopia towards an anti-Western and pro-Soviet position. Ethiopia was a long-time target of Soviet conquest, given its position in the Horn of Africa and proximity to the Red Sea. The Red Sea was part of the gateway to the Indian Ocean. Soviet control of this area would ultimately provide Moscow with a chokehold over commerce headed into the Suez Canal. These Soviet efforts towards the target Ethiopia commenced in the early 1950s.

The Soviet Ambassador Kikanov and his staff of 100 in Addis Ababa toiled feverishly to subvert the Ethiopian government. The Soviet Embassy in Addis Ababa was also the operational headquarters of African communist and leftist groups. The Soviet Embassy also controlled the Czech Legation. Moscow also controlled the East German, Czechoslovak, and other Bloc nationals who appeared in southeast Africa as commercial travelers. Soviet subversion was directed at the underpaid Ethiopian civil servants and discontented intellectuals. The Coptic priests were also the targets of Soviet recruitment. They were in touch with Patriarch Alexei in the USSR. It should be noted that the Russian Orthodox Church in the Soviet Union was a tool of the CPSU and the KGB. The Soviet Embassy also supported Prince Ras Seyoum with Czechoslovak weapons and money. Previously, the opportunistic Prince Ras Seyoum cooperated with the Italian Fascists to pursue the throne.⁷⁷

Colonel Belete of the Ethiopian Democratic Alliance noted that since the early 1970s *“the Soviets and their Western dupes had already trained many Ethiopian students and organized them into what they called the Ethiopian Students Movement. And those students after having completed their studies abroad including in the United States and Western Europe were trained in Soviet ideology which they brought with them back to Ethiopia.”*⁷⁸ Paul Henze, who served at the US Embassy in Addis Ababa from 1968 to 1972, reported that the Soviets contacted junior officers of the Ethiopian army in the early 1970s. Soviet reports also noted that *“in the 1960s-beginning of the 1970s a lot of people came into the (Ethiopian) army convinced of the necessity of destroying the feudal-monarchist edifice”* and these included *“Marxist units, among a part of the middle and junior officers and rank and file sergeants.”* In December 1973,

⁷⁵ Staar, Richard F. Yearbook on International Communist Affairs (Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University) pages 94-95.

⁷⁶ Staar, Richard F. Yearbook on International Communist Affairs 1990 (Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University 1990) pages 91-93.

⁷⁷ Addis Ababa Called Focus of Soviet Spy Activities in Southeast Africa Radio Free Europe Research Eastern Europe August 21, 1952 Accessed From:

http://storage.osaarchivum.org/low/bc/a3/bca3bea7-0a0c-45ea-8baf-282094d9a4a1_1.pdf

⁷⁸ “Col. Belete of Ethiopia” The New American November 21, 1988 pages 18-19.

the Soviets received intelligence that the Ethiopian army planned to engage in mutiny against Emperor Haile Selassie's government. Western countries were unaware of this attempted mutiny. Moscow appointed a new ambassador A. Ratanov, to its embassy in Ethiopia. Ratanov previously served in communist Guinea, which was one of Moscow's revolutionary centers in Africa.⁷⁹ The seeds were already being sown for the communist penetration and overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie.

Another wedge issue that Moscow and its allies took advantage of in Ethiopia was the embers of Eritrean secessionism. The Soviets believed that a separate Marxist Eritrean state would weaken Emperor Selassie's pro-Western government and maintain control over strategic ports on the Red Sea. In 1965, the USSR supplied weapons to the Eritrean secessionists. The Bulgarians also shipped weapons to the Eritreans in 1967. The Czechoslovaks and Hungarians also provided weapons to the Eritrean separatists. The Soviets and Chinese agreed to train the Eritrean forces. In the late 1960s, Cuba and China trained the Eritreans. Since the late 1960s, some Cuban troops served with the Eritreans. Arab allies of the USSR supplied and trained the Eritreans. Such countries and movements included Fatah PLO, Egypt, Iraq, South Yemen, Syria, and Libya. Soviet arms were supplied through these indirect channels. One Eritrean leader admitted that all Soviet arms were funneled through Syria.

Despite the shift of Ethiopia to communism, Moscow and its allies wanted to keep their options open in case the Eritrean Marxist forces defeated or severely mauled the Dergue's forces. There were also efforts to forge unity between the Ethiopian communist regime and the Marxist Eritrean secessionists. After 1977, the Soviets maintained contacts with the EPLF and ELF through the Italian Communist Party and Cuba. ELF leader Ahmad Nasir traveled to the USSR in 1978 and 1980. A Soviet publication noted that negotiations between the Ethiopians and the EPLF were mediated by South Yemen, Cuba, and East Germany in 1978. These negotiations ultimately failed because of the EPLF insistence on separatist demands.⁸⁰

The East Germans and Italian Communist Party sought to negotiate the differences between the *Dergue* and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF). During the 1980s, Ethiopian officials acknowledged contacts with the EPLF. These contacts were under the control of the Soviet Union, Cuba, and South Yemen. Between September 1982 and April 1986, the EPLF and *Dergue* held ten meetings. The Soviets also sought to mediate between the *Dergue* and communist insurgents of the EPLF and the Tigre People's Liberation Front (TPLF).⁸¹

One of the main foreign policy goals of the *Dergue* was the imposition of Soviet-style communism on the African continent. Defecting Ethiopian relief and refugee administration official Dawit Wolde Giorgis noted that "*the joint objectives of the USSR and the Mengistu government are to establish Ethiopia as the first fully communist country in Africa, by restructuring the social fabric and creating a regimented and controlled society. The second objective is then to assume leadership of the communist movement in Africa.*" Giorgis noted that

⁷⁹ Patman, Robert G. The Soviet Union in the Horn of Africa (Cambridge University Press, 2009) pages 192-193.

⁸⁰ Golan, Galia. The Soviet Union and National Liberation Movements in the Third World (Unwin Hyman 1988)

⁸¹ Pascoe, William. "Time for Action Against Mengistu's Ethiopia" Heritage Foundation Reports March 11, 1987

*“The Soviet strategy in Africa is to have a degree of success first in Ethiopia as an example to the rest.”*⁸²

Mengistu followed up on these conquest plans with tangible actions. Ethiopian pilots fought in communist Angola on behalf of the MPLA, while 6,000 Ethiopian troops were stationed in Frelimo-ruled Mozambique. One Ethiopian defector noted that Mengistu set up a 50,000 man special-forces unit which was under the tutelage of the Soviets. These commandos were trained to sabotage communications, destroy vital targets, and sow chaos behind enemy lines. The Soviets also created within Ethiopia a “*black KGB*” for use in Ethiopia and all over Africa. According to various reports “*its members can marry only other members and any children are taken from their parents at ten months of age and shipped to the Soviet Union to be brought up as model agents.*”⁸³

The Ethiopians also supported leftist and Marxist African terrorists. Mengistu channeled Soviet funds and weapons to Mugabe’s ZANU based in Mozambique.⁸⁴ Ethiopia also commenced support for subversive movements in Sudan and Somalia. Ethiopia also offered to train 10,000 ANC terrorists from South Africa.⁸⁵

The rival communists in Somalia were another target of the Dergue’s aggression. This stemmed primarily from a major border dispute over the Ogaden Province, which was claimed by both countries. The *Dergue* was also displeased over Somalia’s strategic convergence of interests with the United States. In 1982 a captured Ethiopian officer Lt. Gezehan Gebre Selassie noted that “*said there was a grand Russian plan to topple the present Somali Government and replace it with a coalition government jointly administered by the Abyssinians and Somalia.*”⁸⁶

The Ethiopians also supported sympathetic secessionist movements in Somalia as part of its strategy to dismember Somalia and overthrow its communist regime. The pro-Ethiopian, pro-Soviet Democratic Front for the Salvation of Somalia (DFSS) called for the creation of a socialist state in Somalia that was aligned with the anti-US bloc. In 1983, the economic program of the DFSS called for the implementation of “*a progressive economic policy which will improve the society’s production and is aimed at freeing the national economy from international capitalism*” and to “*reorganize and protect national industries.*”⁸⁷ In 1986, the DFSS supported “*The establishment of an economic policy free from foreign capitalism.*”⁸⁸

In 1983 the DFSS also supported “*...it is imperative fully to reinstate diplomatic, trade and cultural relations between Somalia and other countries, which Siyad Barreh*⁸⁹ *has broken. The countries in question are the Democratic Republic of Libya, Ethiopia, the Republic of Cuba*

⁸² Valley, Paul “How the West’s food aid keeps a tyrant in power” The Times (London) October 29, 1986

⁸³ Deressa, Yonas. “Rebel aid” National Review April 24, 1987 page 26.

⁸⁴ Bridgland, Fred. “Film Brings Ethiopia’s Red Terror Back Into Focus” The Scotsman October 30, 2001 page 10.

⁸⁵ Pascoe, William. “Time for Action Against Mengistu’s Ethiopia” Heritage Foundation Reports March 11, 1987

⁸⁶ “Testimony of captured Abyssinian officer about Libyan tanks and troops” BBC Summary of Broadcasts October 9, 1982

⁸⁷ “Programme Adopted at Somali Dissident Group’s Congress” Radio Halgan March 8, 1983

⁸⁸ “Somali Rebel Front’s Political Programme” Radio Halgan April 6, 1986

⁸⁹ Siyad Barreh was the communist ruler of Somalia who opposed the interests of the *Dergue* and the USSR over the disputed Ogaden Province.

and other socialist nations...to give strong support for the national rights of the Palestinian people, who are struggling for their independence and return to their motherland under the leadership of the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people...to give full support to the struggle of the Arab peoples opposed to the Camp David agreement, a deceitful, imperialist, Zionist and reactionary move opposed to the freedom, progress, democracy and unity of the Arab people...(to) strongly to condemn terrorism by Israel, its expansionist policies in Palestine, Lebanon, the Golan Heights in Syria, its denial of the rights of Arab people and its continued support for South Africa and to call on it unconditionally to withdraw from the Arab territories it captured in the 1967 war.” The DFSS also condemned alleged “destabilization by international imperialism and its continued provocations of Libya, South Yemen, Syria and countries struggling for their independence in southern Africa.” The DFSS also supported the Polisario Front in the Western Sahara, which fought for the creation of a socialist dictatorship. The DFSS program noted that it also supported the “peoples of Africa who are opposed to imperialist interference and to exploitative economic and social policies in Africa.” Specifically, the DFSS expressed its political solidarity with the ANC and SWAPO. The DFSS also joined hands with radical Islamists and supported the Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran. The DFSS program also supported the removal of “imperialist American” military bases in the Indian Ocean and Red Sea. Lastly, the DFSS naturally aligned itself with the “socialist revolution in Ethiopia” and the world communist movement, who were referred to as “international movements struggling to eradicate the exploitation and oppression inherited from the capitalist system.”⁹⁰ In 1986, the DFSS also supported “the governments of the Arab Jamahiriya of Libya and Nicaragua and is opposed to the provocations and aggression of American imperialism.”⁹¹

Another pro-Ethiopian rebel movement in Somalia during the 1980s was the Somali National Movement (SNM). It also aligned itself with anti-US, anti-Western interests. In 1984, the SNM supported “the legitimate struggle of the people of South Africa and Namibia led by the ANC and SWAPO...the legitimate struggle of the Palestinian people against international Zionism.”⁹²

Mengistu also colluded with Moscow to impose communism in Djibouti through leftwing subversion. A declassified document which outlined the conversation between Mengistu and Soviet Ambassador Ratanov stated “Mengistu stated that up until recently the government of the Republic of Djibouti had taken an unfriendly position toward Ethiopia in respect to the Somali-Ethiopian conflict, by prohibiting the landing of Ethiopian aircraft in Djibouti, rendering medical assistance to wounded Somali soldiers, and so forth. Now, however, that the Republic of Djibouti is suffering a serious economic crisis as a result of Somali aggression and, in particular, now that Somali saboteurs stopped the Addis Ababa-Djibouti railroad from operating, its government has expressed a readiness to enter into a trade relationship with Ethiopia. Mengistu is certain that this positive development in the policy of the Government of the Republic of Djibouti will gain strength. In Djibouti, Mengistu continued, at the present time there are three groups of political forces: (1) the party of the People’s Independence Movement (Marxist-Leninist), advocating independence and creation of a progressive government; (2) the party of the National Union for Independence, advocating nationalist positions for

⁹⁰ “Programme Adopted at Somali Dissident Group’s Congress” Radio Halgan March 8, 1983

⁹¹ “Conclusion of Somali Opposition Group’s Congress” Radio Halgan March 31, 1986

⁹² “Resolutions of Somali National Movement’s Recent Congress” Radio Halgan September 1, 1984

independence; and (3) the right-wing party of the African People's League, advocating, in the final analysis, if not annexation to Somalia, then at least the establishment of special relations with it. Ethiopia is supporting the People's Independence Movement and advising that party to unite with the National Union for Independence for the establishment of an independent existence for the Republic of Djibouti. The People's Independence Movement does not exclude the possibility that in the future that party will be required to resort to armed methods of conflict against the present government, which is persecuting it. In the opinion of Mengistu, the Soviet Union and other socialist countries could, with the help of Ethiopia, if necessary, establish contact with the People's Independence Movement and render support to that party. Toward this end the Soviet Committee for Solidarity of the Countries of Asian and Africa could dispatch a delegation to Addis-Ababa or receive in Moscow a delegation of that party. It would be worthwhile to join forces for this purpose, Mengistu stated, in order to prevent the return of Djibouti to the imperialist bloc."⁹³

Contrary to the myth that US policy forced Ethiopia into the hands of Moscow, the *Dergue* embarked on an anti-American, communist, and pro-Soviet position since its inception in the summer of 1974. One Soviet writer even implied that the *Dergue* took over Ethiopia in August 1974 with external support. In October 1974, the Soviet publication *New Times* hailed Mengistu as "an influential leader in the Armed Forces Movement." Other Soviet publications dubbed Mengistu as "one of the chief organizers of the anti-monarchial coup" and the head of the "revolutionary democratic" faction within the *Dergue*. The Soviets also hailed Mengistu's execution of the first head of the *Dergue*, General Aman Andom. The Soviets alleged General Andom "came out against the revolution" and prepared "a state coup of a pro-American orientation." In early 1975, Mengistu and other *Dergue* members attended short political courses in the USSR.⁹⁴

The *Dergue* first requested an arms agreement with the Soviets in September 1974. In December 1976, an arms agreement was concluded between Ethiopia and the USSR. The first shipment of Soviet-made tanks arrived in Ethiopia in March 1977. Ethiopia signed a Tripartite Agreement with Libya and South Yemen in 1981.⁹⁵ Despite the Sino-Soviet "split," Red China also supplied the *Dergue* with armaments. In 1977, Red China shipped massive amounts of small arms to the *Dergue*, but refused to supply heavy weapons.⁹⁶ The Soviets assigned General Vasiliy I. Petrov, Deputy Commander in Chief of Soviet Ground Forces, to coordinate the

⁹³ "Memorandum of Conversation between Soviet Ambassador to Ethiopia Ratanov and Mengistu regarding fighting between Ethiopian and Somali forces and Ethiopia's support of the People's Independent Movement in Djibouti" September 5, 1977 Accessed From: http://legacy.wilsoncenter.org/va2/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=home.document&identifier=5034E4A1-96B6-175C-92534EC7C711F084&sort=collection&item=Cold%20War%20in%20Africa

⁹⁴ Patman, Robert G. *The Soviet Union in the Horn of Africa* (Cambridge University Press, 2009) pages 192-193.

⁹⁵ Pascoe, William. "Time for Action Against Mengistu's Ethiopia" Heritage Foundation Reports March 11, 1987

⁹⁶ Kissi, Edward. *Revolution and Genocide in Ethiopia and Cambodia* (Lexington Books, 2006) pages 148-149.

Ethiopian/Cuban counteroffensive against Somalia in the war over the Ogaden Province in 1977 and 1978.⁹⁷

After 1976/1977, Mengistu also created the Ministry of State and Public Security (MSPS). It was divided into two departments which dealt with external and internal intelligence. The MSPS external branch managed two employees in Ethiopian Embassies abroad who possessed first secretary rank. Ethiopian intelligence officers subverted Djibouti, Kenya, Sudan, and Egypt under diplomatic cover. In 1984, Sudan expelled Ethiopian diplomats for spying. The MSPS coordinated intelligence activities with the KGB and East German HVA in London, Bonn, Rome, and Washington DC. This was spelled out in MSPS-HVA cooperation accords. In 1982, the MSPS sent 200 agents to North Korea for training in sabotage activities.⁹⁸

South Yemeni pilots served in Ethiopia in early 1978.⁹⁹ Soviet and South Yemeni troops were also reported by a defector from the Ethiopian “*martial law administration*” to be actively fighting Eritrean rebels. The Soviets manned BM-21 rocket launchers, while two USSR naval vessels assisted the Ethiopian navy in bombarding Eritrean rebel positions on the coast. South Yemeni troops manned Soviet-made T-54 tanks in their battle with the Eritrean rebels.¹⁰⁰

By November 1975, the Portuguese government turned control of Angola over to the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), despite the Alvor Agreement which promised free elections in that country. The Portuguese government was under the control of the Armed Forces Movement (AFM), which was dominated by the Left and the Soviet-controlled Portuguese Communist Party. Instead of being expelled from NATO, Portugal remained part of that alliance. Lisbon turned effective control of Angola over to the communist MPLA. In Angola, the Portuguese leftist military government handed power to the communist MPLA in 1975. Admiral Rosa Coutinho was the last colonial Portuguese high commissioner who collaborated with the AFM government in Lisbon to bring the MPLA and foreign communist occupation forces into Angola. He was quoted in an interview with Canadian television as stating that: “*I think I fixed the decolonization process in an irreversible way. I knew very well that elections could not be held in the territory. It would be a fantasy.*”¹⁰¹ The MPLA victory was aided by Portuguese Communists and extreme leftwing elements in the Armed Forces Movement (AFM) government. Portuguese soldiers also occasionally aided MPLA forces in battles against the noncommunist leftists of the National FNLA in 1975. Portuguese troops and MPLA armored units participated in an assault on National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA)¹⁰² installations in Luanda.¹⁰³

⁹⁷ Pascoe, William. “Time for Action Against Mengistu’s Ethiopia” Heritage Foundation Reports March 11, 1987

⁹⁸ Crozier, Brian. The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire (Forum, 1999) page 318.

⁹⁹ Golan, Galia. The Soviet Union and National Liberation Movements in the Third World (Unwin Hyman 1988)

¹⁰⁰ “Soviets, Yemenis Reported Fighting in Eritrea” The Guardian February 2, 1978

¹⁰¹ Amiel, Barbara. “Birth of a Soviet Satellite” Maclean’s August 17, 1987 page 9.

¹⁰² The FNLA, along with UNITA, were rival leftist movements who vied with the MPLA and their foreign communist occupation troops to gain control of Angola. They eventually opposed Marxism-Leninism and the unpopular Cuban, Soviet, and Warsaw Pact advisers and troops in Angola which aided the MPLA.

¹⁰³ Greig, Ian. The Communist Challenge to Africa (Foreign Affairs Publishing Co., 1977) page 217.

Commencing in the early 1980s, the MPLA recruited a dozen Portuguese commandoes with the assistance of the Portuguese communist Admiral Rosa Coutinho.¹⁰⁴ The contingent of Portuguese mercenaries grew to 150 to 200 personnel.¹⁰⁵ It was reported in 1984 that the KGB recruited fifty ex-Portuguese Army senior officers to train SWAPO and MPLA troops in their battles against UNITA and South African forces.¹⁰⁶ Another report indicated that the MPLA also recruited 25 Portuguese mercenary troops who specialized in piloting helicopter and jet fighter planes.¹⁰⁷ As of 1987, UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi charged that there were 3,000 members of the Portuguese Communist Party in Angola who assisted the MPLA.¹⁰⁸ Some Western sources indicated that the MPLA had Cuban forces fighting and advising the MPLA since the late 1960s. In the late spring 1975, Cuba sent 230 troops to aid the MPLA.¹⁰⁹

Foreign troops of various communist states occupied Angola and assisted the MPLA and its armed forces known as the FAPLA. Evelyne Chene of the Times of London reported that 3,000 troops from the Soviet, Union, Portugal, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Romania, Poland, Hungary, and North Korea assisted the MPLA communists.¹¹⁰ The Soviets also trained 1,500 Bulgarian troops in counter-insurgency warfare. They were to be dispatched to Angola to fight against UNITA forces.¹¹¹ Three thousand People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) and Vietnamese troops also served in Angola in a training capacity for MPLA troops.¹¹² In 1984, South African and Western newspapers reported that 4,000 North Korean troops served in Angola, which propped up their MPLA. These soldiers were also reported as providing ideological and military training to the terrorists of the African National Congress (ANC) and SWAPO in a camp located in the town of Quibaxe.¹¹³

Meanwhile, the Cubans and other Soviet bloc nations exploited Angolan resources and industries as payment for their "*internationalist*" assistance. Such practices rivaled the Portuguese colonialists of the pre-1975 period. It was reported by Freedom House in 1978 that "*Their (the Cubans) occupation policy is similar to that of the Soviets in East Europe after the 'liberation:' They were dismantling useable industrial installations and transporting them to Cuba.*" In 1977, Father de Kinderen reported that Angola had bartered its entire coffee and sugar

¹⁰⁴ Amiel, Barbara. "Birth of a Soviet Satellite" Maclean's August 17, 1987 page 9.

¹⁰⁵ De Young, Karen. "Angola Gaining in Fight Against UNITA Rebels" Washington Post September 20, 1985 page A1.

¹⁰⁶ "Ex-Officers Training SWAPO, Luanda Troops" Agence France Presse April 6, 1984

¹⁰⁷ "Reported Recruitment of Portuguese Mercenaries by Angola" Johannesburg Home Service February 11, 1984

¹⁰⁸ "Jonas Savimbi Denied Portuguese Visa" Lisbon Expresso November 1, 1986

¹⁰⁹ Golan, Galia. The Soviet Union and National Liberation Movements in the Third World (Unwin Hyman 1988)

¹¹⁰ Chene, Evelyne. "The Outside Forces Propping Up Angola" The Times (London) September 20 1985

¹¹¹ "Radio Truth Reports Presence of Bulgarian Force" Radio Truth September 12, 1985

¹¹² "UNITA Official on SRV-Cambodian Military Presence in Angola" Bangkok Post August 17, 1979

¹¹³ "North Korea Said to Increase its Troops and Military Advisers" Associated Press July 10, 1985

crop to pay for weapons from Cuba and the Soviet Union.¹¹⁴ It was reported in 1977 that Cubans operated a system of forced labor on Angolan coffee plantations where workers were shifted from one place and job to another.¹¹⁵

The MPLA also provided assistance to various “*liberation*” movements in Africa, such as the ANC and SWAPO. Arnaud de Borchgrave also reported that the Cubans and Portuguese Communists trained leftist rebels from the Shaba Province in Zaire. These rebels were based in Angola and staged their attacks from MPLA-held territory.¹¹⁶ The Angolans also served Soviet interests through joint espionage operations in NATO countries. In 1987, it was reported that Angolan intelligence (DISA) operated from the Angolan Embassy. The DISA and the KGB residents in Lisbon engaged in intelligence cooperation. DISA established communications units in Lisbon equipped with small tape recorders and telex machines. A unit of swallows (women) of mulatto and black ethnic extraction entrapped Western citizens and elites. These female agents were trained at special school in Luanda by Soviets who were able to pass themselves off as Portuguese.¹¹⁷

In the early 1920s, Soviet troops installed a group of revolutionary communists as the ruling elite in Mongolia. Mongolia immediately became a pliant Soviet ally from the 1920s to the early 1990s. During World War II, Mongolia provided the Soviet Union 35,000 horses, 2.5 million tugriks¹¹⁸, and 300 kilograms in gold. The Mongolians also financed an armored column of 53 tanks for Soviet forces during World War II. The Mongolian Herdsman aircraft squadron fought alongside the Soviet Army.¹¹⁹ Communist Mongolia declared war on Japan in August 1945, and deployed 80,000 troops to assist the Soviets in their invasion of Manchukuo (Manchuria).¹²⁰ The Mongolians also provided the North Koreans and North Vietnamese with financial aid during their “*wars of liberation*.”¹²¹

Since the late 1960s, Chadian leftist, separatist rebels fought against the Western-supported government. They were backed by Libya and the communist bloc. The rebels were committed to establishing a “*democratic, popular and socialist regime and at overthrowing the usurper clique whom international imperialism has installed in Ndjamena (Chad’s capital city)*.”¹²² During the civil war in Chad, East German troops were reported to have manned

¹¹⁴ “The Front-Line States: The Realities in Southern Africa” The Heritage Foundation March 26, 1979 Accessed From: <http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/9523.pdf>

¹¹⁵ Greig, Ian. *The Communist Challenge to Africa* (Foreign Affairs Publishing Company 1977) pages 108-109.

¹¹⁶ “The Front-Line States: The Realities in Southern Africa” The Heritage Foundation March 26, 1979 Accessed From: <http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/9523.pdf>

¹¹⁷ “KGB Trains DISA Agents Bound for Portugal” *Lisbon Tempo* July 30, 1987

¹¹⁸ The domestic Mongolian currency.

¹¹⁹ “Mongolia: A Country Study” Accessed From:

http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/Mongolia%20Study_5.pdf

¹²⁰ Kotkin, Stephen and Elleman, Bruce A. *Mongolia in the Twentieth Century: Landlocked Cosmopolitan* (M.E. Sharpe 1999) page 164.

¹²¹ “Mongolia: A Country Study” Accessed From:

http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/Mongolia%20Study_5.pdf

¹²² “Formation by Goukouni Oueddei and Other GUNT Faction Leaders of New Council” *Radio Bardai* August 13, 1984

Soviet-made long-range artillery guns in an assault on Oum-Chalouba in northeastern Chad.¹²³ Chadian news media reported in 1981 that Soviet and East German advisers served in Chad to assist the Libyan and Chadian leftist rebel forces in operating Soviet built armaments.¹²⁴ North Korean pilots were reportedly assisting pro-Qaddafi rebels in northern Chad in 1984.¹²⁵

Starting in 1973, Polisario Front rebels fought against Spanish troops in an effort to create a separatist leftwing state in the Western Sahara. In 1976, Spain turned the Western Sahara over to Mauritania and Morocco. Polisario Front troops fought against Mauritania and Morocco in an effort to impose a leftwing dictatorship in Western Sahara. Various communist bloc and Arab radical regimes supported the Polisario Front with weapons and training.

The Cubans also provided assistance to the Polisario Front rebels fighting against Moroccan occupation of the Western Sahara. They provided advisers and troops for the Front to fight Moroccan garrisons and training officers to serve as “*battalion leaders*” in the diplomatic arena. In 1977, meetings were held in Algiers and Havana to plan the level of military support provided to the Polisario Front. In 1988, a Cuban military delegation traveled to Tindouf, Algeria to review the Moroccan army’s defensive perimeters and develop tactics for the Polisario Front in an effort to help them breach the defensive wall that had been constructed by Morocco. Cuban military advisors conducted simulation exercises for the Polisario Front. Elements of the Cuban Navy also provided logistical support off the coast of the Spanish Canary Islands for the Polisario Front.

Since 1976, hundreds of Saharan children were also sent to Cuban “*education*” centers to be indoctrinated in communism in preparation for the eventual “*liberation*” of Western Sahara.¹²⁶ They were provided with communist indoctrination in Cuba. One such student was Hamoudi Al Bihi. He was one of hundreds of Saharan students who were indoctrinated in Cuba in 1989. He noted “*We were sent to Cuba at a very early age. We were just kids but we were used as a means to keep our families hostages in Tindouf and prevent them from returning to Morocco... We were actually trained to be enrolled in the Polisario militias.*” These children were aged 8-10 years old and were trained in Cuban military facilities. Another student named Hamoudi Al Bihi reported that “*We were trained to handle both light and heavy weapons.*”¹²⁷ Former Cuban military instructor Daniel Alarcon noted that “*Sahrawi children, who are sent to Cuba, followed military training and courses on making explosives... These children followed military training and courses on the making of explosives... We taught children how to make home-made explosives with such products as sugar, coffee, sulphur, and nitroglycerine... several children were killed. Their bodies should still be buried in the island if they were not exhumed.*” Former Cuban intelligence officer Juan Vives reported that “*Children were obliged to work in*

¹²³ “GDR Technicians Said to help Chad Rebels” Daily Telegraph (London) July 9, 1983 pages 5-6.

¹²⁴ “ATP Confirms Presence of USSR, GDR Advisers” Agence France Presse March 1, 1981

¹²⁵ “Report Says North Korean Pilots Played Role in Chad Offensive” Associated Press June 8, 1984

¹²⁶ Holley, Robert M. Cuba and the Polisario Front (Moroccan American Center for Policy August 16, 2005)

http://www.moroccanamericanpolicy.org/upload/documents/14_20061221083312.pdf

¹²⁷ Ali Haidar. “Tindouf: The forgotten Children Deported to Cuba” Sahara News May 15, 2013 Accessed From: <http://sahara-question.com/en/opinions/tindouf-forgotten-children-deported-cuba>

the fields in the morning and go to school in the afternoon. Some did not cease to cry, claiming their parents. It was inhumane. Some arrived so young to Cuba that they hardly remembered from where they came. And it is very inhumane."¹²⁸

The Polisario Front also launched communist-style propaganda campaigns which sought to portray their forces and provisional government as freedom fighters, while damning Morocco as oppressive lackeys of imperialism. Former Polisario Front propaganda official and Politburo member Mhamed Bouh was in charge of protocol in 1989, where he supervised foreign delegations' visits in the Tindouf camps. He also served as an army political commissar. Bouh noted that *"the diplomatic campaign generously financed by Libyan and Algerian slush funds to snatch recognitions of the Sahrawi Republic 'SADR' was a partial failure, since such recognitions are still very limited geographically. If Algerian and Libyan petrodollars have pressed on the leaders of some African and Latin American countries to recognize the SADR, the tactic proved unsuccessful in the Arab world and the Middle East, as well as in the former communist bloc..."* He also reported that *"A different scenario was worked out according to each delegation... Visits of military training camps for women were thus planned for communist delegations while schedules of delegates of humanitarian organizations were limited to meetings where women and children would talk about their misery and dire living conditions. Delegations of social democratic obedience would be received by women completely dedicated to voluntary and social work, while an Iranian delegation would be welcomed by veiled, shy women. Actually, all these women were the same. They were just acting and changing roles in accordance with the instructions of the leadership... We built a sham organization, able to show everyone what they wanted to see. It was a real moral fraud, but it represented what has become of the Polisario..."*¹²⁹

The Polisario Front sold medicines and food donated by the West to markets in Mali, Mauritania, and Algeria to raise hard currency to purchase weapons and ammunition. The Polisario Front also used donated food and medicines to enforce totalitarian control in the Tindouf camps. The Polisario Front even sold donated water to the refugees in the Tindouf camps. Ghoulam Najem Mouichame, the former representative of the Polisario Front in Bremen, Germany, observed that *"Throughout my mission in Germany, I was led to ascertain that a sizeable amount of all sorts of humanitarian aid sent by the German donors to the populations of the Tindouf camps was systematically embezzled by members of the Polisario, who proceeded to sell it in the south of Algeria and the north of Mauritania."* The Polisario Front also embezzled funds provided by the West and humanitarian groups and spent the money on airline tickets for the Front leadership to travel abroad. The newspaper El Watan reported that *"noodles and spaghetti, sent by the Italian government and people, were disposed of through selling in the Algiers' markets-and even on the pavements-for 35 Dinars a pound. On the wrappings of the products is clearly indicated in Italian and Arabic that these items are donated by the Italian government and people."* Two Australian journalists, Violeta Ayal and Daniel Falshaw, told a

¹²⁸ "Sahara issue Sahrawi children inhumanely treated in Cuba, former Cuban official" Morocco Times March 31, 2006 Accessed From:

<http://newsgroups.derkeiler.com/Archive/Soc/soc.culture.cuba/2006-04/msg00201.html>

¹²⁹ Abdelhak Kettani. "The Polisario's Deception as Revealed by a Former Leader" Tindouf.org January 30, 2013 Accessed From:

http://www.tindouf.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=170:the-polisarios-deception-as-revealed-by-a-former-leader&catid=1&Itemid=19

press conference at the United Nations in New York in October 2007 that “*Slavery is a real institution in the Tindouf camps...Our stupefaction was even greater, since we could never have imagined this practice could have taken place within the camps, where black people are the victims.*” They noted that “*black families do not have any rights.*” Enslaved black families were considered by the Polisario Front as “*the property of their masters, who pass them on to their descendants. Worse, slavery is legally regulated and protected by the law. It is not only a social practice.*”¹³⁰

Despite the assertions of left-progressives and the anti-Cold Warriors, Grenada posed another potential regional threat when it was ruled by the communist New Jewel Movement (NJM) from 1979 to 1983. It became in a short time “*another Cuba.*” The NJM regime also sought to expand its military power, partially in an effort to export communist revolution in the small nations of the Caribbean island chain. As early as 1976, the NJM Bureau concluded that the United States was the “*No. 1 enemy*” that “*will not let us take power without a fight. (We must) understand what we are up against.*”¹³¹

Contrary to the notions of the American Left, the United States did not “*push*” Grenada into the arms of the Soviets and Cubans. Instead, the NJM maintained ties to the Soviets, Cubans, and Marxist Guyanese government in the years before 1979. The Soviets also realized the strategic importance of Grenada in the whole equation for dominance of the Caribbean Islands. In August 1969, a Soviet trawler visited Grenada and was docked at St Georges. Crew members photographed and measured the Calivigny Point peninsula. In 1963, NJM leader Maurice Bishop traveled to East Germany and Czechoslovakia while attending school in London. A Cuban DA officer named Oswaldo Cardenas was assigned to work with the NJM before the 1979 coup. Bishop and other NJM member traveled to Havana and returned back to Grenada with guerilla warfare manuals and revolutionary literature. Such documents were confiscated by authorities. Hudson Austin, future commander of the People’s Revolutionary Army (PRA) received military training in Cuba and Guyana along with a half a dozen other Grenadians. Several days before March 1979, black Cuban Directorate of Special Operations (DOE) commandos were infiltrated into Grenada. A Soviet “*cruise ship*”, the *Taras Shevchenko*, paid a visit to the port of St Georges on the night before the 1979 coup. Suspiciously, the *Taras Shevchenko* remained in port throughout the revolution. Soviet crewmen were observed monitoring the NJM revolution via hand held radios. They were sighted at Point Salines, Richmond Hill, and St George’s.¹³² In 1976, a Grenada-Cuba Association was set up as a Trojan horse for Havana to be involved in Grenadian politics. The Association dispatched delegations to Cuba in 1977 and 1978. NJM soldiers were sent to Cuba and Guyana for training prior to the 1979 revolution. Cubans and Guyanese were present during the March 1979 revolution. In April 1979 Cuban ships started to secretly unload weapons for the PRA.¹³³

It appeared that Grenada was tasked to serve as a beachhead for revolution in the Caribbean. Former Grenadian Ambassador to the Soviet Union W. Richard Jacobs noted in a

¹³⁰ “Humanitarian Aid” Freedom For All Accessed From: <http://www.freedom-for-all.org/refugees/humanitarian-aid.php>

¹³¹ Sandford, Gregory and Vigilante, Richard. Grenada: The Untold Story (Madison Books, 1984) pages 54-55.

¹³² Ashby, Timothy. The Bear in the Backyard (Lexington Books, 1987) pages 81-84.

¹³³ Sandford, Gregory and Vigilante, Richard. Grenada: The Untold Story (Madison Books, 1984) pages 54-55.

July 1983 government report that: *“Our revolution has to be viewed as a world-wide process with its original roots in the Great October Revolution... We have to establish ourselves as the authority on events in at least the English speaking Caribbean and be the sponsor of revolutionary activity and progressive developments in this region at least. To the extent that we can take credit for bringing any other country into the progressive fold, our prestige and influence would be greatly enhanced.”*¹³⁴ In 1980, Maurice Bishop exhorted: *“By 1981, we will be able to speak not just of revolutionary Cuba - not just of revolutionary Nicaragua-but also of revolutionary El Salvador, Revolutionary Guatemala and Honduras!”*¹³⁵

Grenada sought to build an army which was to consist of 6,000 troops and 300 officers as of 1980. There was a NJM plan from 1983 to 1985 to equip the PRA with 20,000 troops or 20% of the country's population. One document noted from an unnamed NJM official *“that any excess weapons...could be sent to other countries that were having revolutions.”* The PRA possessed 900 British-made Enfield rifles and Chinese-made antitank weapons from Vietnam, which were then transshipped from Grenada to Guatemala, Lebanon, El Salvador, and Guinea Bissau. Apparently in April 1979 Cuba provided the PRA with 900 British-made .303 rifles and 350 US-made M-16s.¹³⁶

The PRA and Grenadian agents intervened in various Caribbean, Latin American, and African nations. In May 1979, Grenadian troops landed on the island nation of St Vincent to overthrow its government.¹³⁷ Grenada also dispatched 500 troops to fight with SWAPO in Namibia.¹³⁸ Grenadian *brigadistas* also worked in Nicaragua. They were sent in October 1980 to assist the Sandinistas. Some were killed in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations against Miskito Indian resisters.¹³⁹ On May 24, 1983, Soviet Ambassador Sazhenev told Maurice Bishop that a Soviet military aircraft carrying *“39 paratroopers”* would be sent to Grenada with Cuban pilots.¹⁴⁰ In October 1980, Grenadian troops assisted the Sandinista Army in crushing the Miskito Indians and black Creoles on Nicaragua's Atlantic coast.¹⁴¹ In NJM-ruled Grenada, a Soviet-made AN-2 transport plane was to be used to drop Grenadian paramilitary forces onto the island nations of St Vincent, St Lucia, Antigua, and Dominica. The St Lucian Ambassador to the OAS Joseph Edmunds noted that *“They even had trial landings. It seems to some like a small thing; it wasn't.”*¹⁴²

Despite assertions to the contrary, the airport in Grenada was to be used as an airbase for Soviet and Cuban military transport aircraft. Grenadian Minister of Mobilization Selwyn Strachan noted in 1981 that the airport would assist Cuba in ferrying troops to Africa. Strachan

¹³⁴ Whelan, James Robert and Jaeckle, Franklin A. The Soviet Assault on America's Southern Flank (Regnery Gateway, 1988) pages 34-35.

¹³⁵ “Mediagraphy of the Grenada Revolution” The Grenada Revolution Online Accessed From: <http://www.thegrenadarevolutiononline.com/mediagraphy.html>

¹³⁶ Central Intelligence Agency. “Grenada: A First Look at Mechanisms of Control and Foreign Involvement” August 20, 1984 Accessed From: http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0000696919.pdf

¹³⁷ Ashby, Timothy. The Bear in the Backyard (Lexington Books, 1987) page 89.

¹³⁸ Ibid, page 92.

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid, page 100.

¹⁴¹ Brownfeld, Allen. Revolution Lobby (Council for Inter-American Security, 1985) page 64.

¹⁴² Geyer, Georgie Ann. Guerrilla Prince (Garrett County Press 2011) page 355.

also noted that the airport's "*strategic location*" to important sea and oil transport routes would enhance Soviet power. A captured notebook of a Soviet-trained NJM official contained an entry from October 1983 which asserted that "*the Party wanted Bishop to sign for the Airport to be a Military Base and he did do that.*"¹⁴³ NJM Central Committee member Liam James wrote in his notebook in early 1980 that: "*The Revo has been able to crush counter-revolution internationally, airport will be used for Cuban and Soviet military.*"¹⁴⁴ The NJM leader and Prime Minister Maurice Bishop himself admitted in an interview with Newsweek in March 31, 1980 that: "*Suppose there's a war next door, where the forces of Fascism are about to take control, and the Trinidadians need assistance... Why should we oppose anybody passing through Grenada to assist them?*"¹⁴⁵ At an April 1982 meeting between Grenadians and Cubans, General Arnaldo Ochoa spoke about the use of the Grenadian airport by Cubans "*in case of emergency.*" In a discussion with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in April 1983, Prime Minister Bishop emphasized that the airport would be a "*strategic factor, which is well known.*"¹⁴⁶

In 1957, the leftwing, anti-colonial leader Kwame Nkrumah became the President of Ghana. By 1958, Nkrumah started to acquire dictatorial powers and moved Ghana in a communist direction. This was done on Soviet advice. Soviet Professor Potekhin addressed the seminar and ordered that Nkrumah establish a one-party state. With the assistance of the Soviets, Nkrumah set up a school for political indoctrination.¹⁴⁷ One Ghanaian newspaper Ghana Evening News called Nkrumah the "*Lenin of Africa.*"¹⁴⁸ Nkrumah's advisers included former leftwing Labor Party MP Geoffrey Bing and the former South African Senator Hymie Basner.¹⁴⁹

Nkrumah's government also developed a pervasive secret police and intelligence presence in the United States and within Ghana itself. Ghanaian secret police also monitored the OAU conference masqueraded as OAU stenographers and clerks and was able to gain valuable intelligence on Africa's leaders.¹⁵⁰ One Ghanaian agent named Sidi-Ali was sent to New York to spy on Ghanaian students in the United States. He was trained at institutes in Ghana and the USSR. Other exiles such as Thomas Oduro Kwartan gave an interview to CBS and was prompted threatened by officials and agents of the Ghanaian government.¹⁵¹

¹⁴³ Department of Defense. "Grenada: A Preliminary Report" page 30 Accessed From: http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/International_security_affairs/grenada/153.pdf

¹⁴⁴ "Behind the Scenes in Marxist Grenada" Heritage Foundation Report November 21, 1984 Accessed From: http://s3.amazonaws.com/thf_media/1984/pdf/bg393.pdf

¹⁴⁵ Sylvester, Michael. "Grenada: Perspectives of a New Communist State" Accessed From: <http://www.thegrenadarevolutiononline.com/perspectives.html>

¹⁴⁶ Pryor, Frederic L. Revolutionary Grenada: A Study in Political Economy (Praeger, 1986) pages 95-98.

¹⁴⁷ Metrowich, F.R. Africa and Communism (Voortrekkerpers, 1967) Accessed From: <http://www.rhodesia.nl/Africa%20and%20Communism.pdf>

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ Ghana students in United States oppose U.S. aid to Nkrumah Staff conferences of the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate August 29, 1963, and January 11, 1964 Accessed From: <http://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/008514977>

The Soviets, Chinese, and East Germans funneled military and intelligence assistance to Ghana during Nkrumah's rule. In 1961 Ghana bought 8 IL-18s transport planes from the USSR. In 1963, the Soviets provided a Mi-4 helicopter to Ghana. In 1965, President Nkrumah concluded an agreement to acquire weapons from the USSR for the Ghana Presidential Guard. The weapons that were acquired included 24 light artillery guns, 21 medium mortars, 15 antiaircraft guns, 20 heavy machine guns, and massive quantities of ammunition. In 1964, Soviet naval crews manned 4 patrol boats based at Tema. These vessels transported weapons to leftist movements in Ghana's neighbors. In early 1966, the Soviet Union started construction of a new air base near Tamale in northern Ghana.¹⁵² The Presidential Guard had Soviet, Chinese, and Egyptian communist advisers serving under Soviet Colonel Zanlegu. This force was equipped with modern arms imported into the ports of Tema, Takaradia, and Elma.¹⁵³

In 1963 it was estimated that over \$30.9 million was spent on weapons such as barracks for troops, radios for the military, armored cars, escort vessels, minesweepers, small destroyers, military airports and bases, and increases in the number of troops for engineer, parachute, infantry, and armored units. Ghanaian troops were also stationed in Cienfuegos in Cuba and were commanded by Soviet officers. They were part of an international brigade in Cuba. Over 800 of them were executed for mutiny. Chinese and Algerian soldiers also were part of this brigade.¹⁵⁴

China provided a loan for Ghana to build 2 arms factories in October 1962. In 1964, the Chinese and Ghanaians concluded a secret agreement for the provision of arms and trainers for African leftist terrorists. In late 1964, 5 Chinese PLA guerrilla warfare experts arrived at Half Assini Training Camp. Other Chinese instructors trained guerrillas at Obenimase Camp in Ashanti Region. Ghanaians also attended a three-month espionage training course in China. Students who attended these courses were from Zaire, Niger, Cameroon, Fernando Po, Tanzania, Zambia, Rwanda, Togo, Cote d'Ivoire, Upper Volta, Gabon, Nigeria, and Guinea.¹⁵⁵

Soviet advisers worked at secret Bureau of African Affairs camps, at the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute in Winneba, and at numerous other security, intelligence, and military bases. At least 76 Ghanaian army officers attended military schools in the Soviet Union. Ghana Young Pioneers were trained at Komsomol schools in the Soviet Union.¹⁵⁶

Like other major communist powers, East Germany sought to exploit Kwame Nkrumah's radicalism to erode Western influence in Ghana and to use Ghana as a base for spreading communism throughout West Africa. The relationship between the two countries began in 1964, when the Bureau of African Affairs approached the East German Trade Mission in Accra and requested intelligence training for its staff. Subsequently, two East German officers who worked for the Ministry of State Security traveled to Ghana to assess the bureau's training requirements.

¹⁵² "Ghana: A Country Study" Accessed From: <http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-5344.html>

¹⁵³ Metrowich, F.R. *Africa and Communism* (Voortrekkerpers, 1967) Accessed From: <http://www.rhodesia.nl/Africa%20and%20Communism.pdf>

¹⁵⁴ Ghana students in United States oppose U.S. aid to Nkrumah Staff conferences of the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate August 29, 1963, and January 11, 1964 Accessed From: <http://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/008514977>

¹⁵⁵ "Ghana: A Country Study" Accessed From: <http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-5346.html>

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

One of these officers remained in Ghana and inaugurated a “*Secret Service and Intelligence Work*” course for seven members of the Bureau of African Affairs. This officer later offered an “*Intelligence Work Under Diplomatic Cover*” course for six other people who worked in the Bureau of African Affairs and who eventually were assigned to posts in Zambia, Nigeria, Kenya, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, and Burundi. East Germany also helped the Ghanaian government to create an intelligence section in the Bureau of African Affairs. These activities ended after Nkrumah’s downfall.¹⁵⁷ It was estimated that \$480,000 was allocated to the Bureau of African Affairs. At least \$448,000 was used for propaganda and underground work.¹⁵⁸

The Kwame Nkrumah Institute of Economics and Political Science was created in February 1961. President Nkrumah noted to a meeting of the African Affairs Committee in November 1959 that he wanted “*to convert the Winneba Party College to an institute where selected dedicated members of all nationalist movements of Africa could be rigidly indoctrinated in the realism of African unity...*” The purpose of the Kwame Nkrumah Institute of Economics and Political Science was “*to propagate firmly the essence of African unity in Ghana and throughout the Continent of Africa.*” According to a high level official of the Ghanaian security and intelligence services, “*the Russian security experts suggested to the ex-President, who readily accepted, that future recruitment into the security services should be through the Ideological Institute at Winneba. It was in response to this that the head of the Special Branch sent a number of Special Branch officers to the Ideological Institute.*” The Institute was “*to train African Freedom Fighters in the spirit of the African revolution, pan-Africanism and socialism in such a way that when they return to their homelands they will be better armed to take an active part in liberating their countries from imperialism; colonialism and neocolonialism; to train Africans in the spirit of pan-Africanism as a method of making progress toward African Union; to train Africans in the spirit of Nkrumaism which is considered like the development of Marxism in conditions and circumstances peculiar to Africa, and to train Africans in the spirit of proletarian internationalism.*” The curriculum of the Institute was “*to provide ideological education to activists and Freedom Fighters of the African struggle against imperialism, colonialism and neocolonialism.*” The Director of the Institute, Kodwo Addison noted in October 1965 that “*Just as Leninism is Marxism in the period of imperialism, Nkrumaism is Marxism in the era of neo-colonialism. We embrace scientific socialism and fully agree with Marxism-Leninism.*” From 1962 to 1964, Somalis, Kenyans, Nigerians, Senegalese, and Malawians were enrolled at the Institute.¹⁵⁹ In 1963, Nkrumah provided funds totaling 18,000 rands to Dahomey trade unionists to overthrow that country’s pro-Western government. Ghana also supported leftwing terrorists in Congo and an anti-Federal movement in Nigeria. The Upper

¹⁵⁷ “Ghana: A Country Study” Accessed From: <http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-5345.html>

¹⁵⁸ Ghana students in United States oppose U.S. aid to Nkrumah Staff conferences of the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate August 29, 1963, and January 11, 1964 Accessed From: <http://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/008514977>

¹⁵⁹ “Kwame Nkrumah’s Ideological Institute-Winneba Ghana” Accessed From: <http://www.niica.on.ca/ghana/Ideology.aspx>

Volta president accused Nkrumah of personally appointing a new president of Upper Volta to succeed the pro-Western leader Yameogo.¹⁶⁰

In 1979 and again in 1981, Flight Lt. Jerry Rawlings took over as a military dictator in Ghana. He formed a junta called the Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC). He shifted Ghana to the Left, especially in foreign policy. Foreign communist advisers and troops trickled into Ghana under Rawlings tenure. Under the Rawlings regime, an unknown number of Libyan military personnel participated in Ghanaian military exercises as observers. Also, an unknown number of Libyan soldiers received jungle warfare training in Ghana. In May 1983, the Ghanaian government received artillery pieces and ammunition from Libya.¹⁶¹

In late 1986, Ghana's National Secretariat of Committees for the Defense of the Revolution signed an agreement with the Soviet Union for assistance in training national cadres. At the end of the 1980s, an unknown number of Ghanaian intelligence and army commandos received training in the Soviet Union.¹⁶² There was also a proposal by the Rawlings regime to invite 5,000 Cuban troops into Ghana in 1984. Special Presidential Adviser Kodjo Tsikata and communist elements within the ruling PNDC supported the stationing of these Cuban troops in the town of Tamale, which is 250 miles north of Accra. When Cuban Foreign Minister Isidoro Malmierca conferred with Rawlings and the Upper Volta dictator Capt. Thomas Sankara, the topic of stationing Cuban troops in Ghana was brought up. It was reported that fifty Cuban soldiers were already transported to Ghana.¹⁶³ Another report indicated that East German, Bulgarian, and Libyan troops and advisers were aiding Ghana's police, army, and security services.¹⁶⁴

By the late 1970s, Albert Rene took over the Seychelles from the pro-Western government. Rene aligned himself with the international Left many years before he took power. While in London, Rene attended meetings of the British Communist Party and took part in communist-inspired street demonstrations in the early 1960s. During academic recesses Rene visited the USSR. Rene admitted in 1979 that he was one of the thousands who marched in London in 1962 shouting "*Kennedy No! Castro Si! Cuba Si!*"

When Albert Rene took over the Seychelles, he had 60 militants in a task force when he took over the country. Some of the members of the task force comprised of police officers. Rene was also assisted by 200 militant workers and Tanzanian troops. Rene declared a "*non-Marxist form of Socialism*" and nonalignment in foreign policy. Rene was received by Red Chinese dictator and Communist Party General Secretary Hua Kuo-feng in Beijing who declared that Beijing was "*squarely behind Seychelles' just proposal for turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace.*" In 1981, in the wake of an attempted coup, the Soviets sent a Kana class guided missile cruiser and Krivak-2 class guided missile frigate to visit the Seychelles. Moscow dispatched naval vessels again in 1982 and 1983. The Seychelles voted for all Soviet positions in

¹⁶⁰ Metrowich, F.R. Africa and Communism (Voortrekkerpers, 1967) Accessed From: <http://www.rhodesia.nl/Africa%20and%20Communism.pdf>

¹⁶¹ "Ghana: A Country Study" Accessed From: <http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-5348.html>

¹⁶² "Ghana: A Country Study" Accessed From: <http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-5344.html>

¹⁶³ "Ghana Contemplates Inviting 5,000 Cuban Troops" Agence France Presse April 16, 1984

¹⁶⁴ Zecchini, Laurent. "Ghana in Need of More Rawlings 'Inspiration'" Manchester Guardian Weekly June 29, 1986 page 13.

the General Assembly of the UN between 1977 and 1983. By late 1984, East German, North Korean, and Libyan personnel joined the Soviets and Cubans in the Seychelles. The East Germans set up 3 radar units to monitor the American base at Diego Garcia. The North Koreans dispatched 60 soldiers to bolster the 120 Tanzanian troops in the Seychelles. The Libyans handled weapons deliveries from the Soviet bloc. In 1987, there were reports of Soviet troops establishing a secret base on the Seychelles. It was reported that 50 Soviet naval infantry troops landed in the Seychelles from the Soviet amphibious landing ship Ivan Rogov in 1986.¹⁶⁵

By 1974-1975 Sao Tome e Principe became independent of Portugal and was turned over to the communists of the Movement for the Liberation of Sao Tome e Principe (MLSTP). The AFM of Portugal handed power over to the MLSTP whose leaders were trained in East Germany or took orders from the USSR. Others were members of the Portuguese Communist Party. On Soviet orders 1,000-1,500 Angolan troops were sent under the command of Cuban and Soviet officers.¹⁶⁶ The Soviets were present in that country as military advisers and allegedly were proposing to set up a submarine base in that country.¹⁶⁷ An East German Stasi officer also provided assistance to the Sao Tome and Principe government.¹⁶⁸ Another source spoke of this base being protected by 2,000 Soviet and Cuban troops and SA-5 SAMs from the USSR.¹⁶⁹

Julius Nyerere and his successor Ali Hassan Mwinyi ruled in an authoritarian socialist fashion in Tanzania. While they were socialist ideologues, Nyerere and Mwinyi also followed the classic Leninist model of using capitalists to build communism. For example, President Mwinyi noted in 1986 regarding IMF aid: *"I would like to assure the people that the agreement did not make us change the principles of our policy of socialism and self-reliance. We have all the time been basing our approach on the task of broadening and strengthening our policy of socialism and self-reliance and doing everything to ensure that government directives fall within these principles."*¹⁷⁰ In 1984, President Nyerere noted at a press conference at the State House that Tanzania would continue to invite foreign firms to invest in the country under mutual agreements which did not violate the principles of either party. Nyerere also admitted that *"I have been advised that it is correct to use capitalists to develop socialism."* The 1967 Arusha Declaration, which was written by President Nyerere, welcomed foreign investment in Socialist Tanzania. For example, the General Tire Company formed a joint venture with the Tanzanian government in 1967.¹⁷¹ Tanzania received between 1970 and 1989 \$9.5 billion from Western nations. One observer noted that *"For a government which for 20 years crooned 'socialism and self-reliance,' Nyerere's 'achievement' was quite the opposite: dependence on imports and*

¹⁶⁵ Crozier, Brian. The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire (Forum, 1999) pages 338-343.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid, pages 344-345.

¹⁶⁷ "Tome Denies Reports on Soviet Military Bases" Japan Economic Newswire December 18, 1984

¹⁶⁸ "Pinto da Costa Wins Third Term as President" Associated Press September 30, 1985

¹⁶⁹ "African Island Nation Said to Host Soviet Garrison" Christian Science Monitor March 21, 1984 page 2.

¹⁷⁰ "Tanzania: President Mwinyi Says Bitter IMF Pill Had To Be Swallowed" Dar es Salaam home service December 2, 1986

¹⁷¹ Ndembwike, John. Life in Tanzania Today and Since the Sixties (Intercontinental Books, 2010) pages 149-150.

foreign aid. But Nyerere operated an efficient public relations machinery abroad, through which he projected himself as a respectable figure in international circles."¹⁷²

Tanzania also established close military ties with various communist and radical states. During the 1960s and 1970s, Tanzania imported weapons from Red China. The Tanzanian People's Defense Forces (TPDF) maintained an active duty force which consisted of 17,000 troops. The air force retained 30 Chinese-made copies of Soviet MIG fighter planes. In 1978, Tanzania received 24 Soviet MIGs and an unknown amount of Soviet-made SAMs. As of 1977, Tanzania hosted 1,000 Chinese economic technicians. Cuba and the USSR stationed 365 technicians, while Libya supplied weapons.¹⁷³

The Tanzanians also sought to influence the international Left into believing that Nyerere was a unique, progressive African socialist. The Tanzanian intelligence services only encouraged these types of active measures programs. One Tanzanian secret police official Marcelino Komba worked on the Tanzanian-funded British publication *Africa* as a senior writer. The Tanzanian secret police also paid writers to compose letters to the editor full of praise for the Nyerere regime.¹⁷⁴

Tanzania also assisted its revolutionary Marxist comrades in other African countries. For example, in December 1986, Bank of Tanzania officials were forced to release foreign currency coming into government coffers, including IMF funds, to support the FRELIMO regime in its battles against the RENAMO forces.¹⁷⁵ In 1987, Tanzanian troops totaling 3,000 entered Mozambique to assist Frelimo.¹⁷⁶

In 1975, the Portuguese leftist Armed Forces Movement (AFM) turned over Mozambique to the communist terrorists of Frelimo, to the detriment of other nationalist or pro-independence movements. Frelimo fought against the Portuguese and their African allies since the early 1960s. It adopted a full-fledged Marxist-Leninist ideology by the late 1960s. After the transition of power to Frelimo in 1975, Mozambique became another tool in Moscow's efforts to dominate southern Africa and its resource rich nations and strategic maritime location. It was also significant that the Portuguese leftist military government that replaced the fascistic Caetano regime actively assisted in transferring power to Frelimo, at the expense of other nationalist groups. The Armed Forces Movement (AFM) government in Lisbon ordered troops to assume defensive operations and AFM committees in Mozambique independent of the national government refused to replenish weapons supplies. The Frelimo security forces created a plan in Tanzania to arrest anti-Frelimo opposition. Portugal reportedly aided the Frelimo in the arrest of the oppositionists. Students were enticed to return from foreign countries and were arrested at the airports. Portuguese secret police arrested anti-Frelimo activists at the country's airports and handed them over to Frelimo. Nationalists of the PCN were sent to Frelimo military barracks.¹⁷⁷

¹⁷² Ibid.

¹⁷³ "The Front Line States" Heritage Foundation March 26, 1979 Accessed From:

<http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/9523.pdf>

¹⁷⁴ Mwijage, Ludovick S. *The Dark Side of Nyerere's Legacy* (The Adelphi Press London 1994) Accessed From: <http://www.zanzinet.org/files/darkside.txt>

¹⁷⁵ Ayittey, George. "Restoring Africa's Free Market Tradition" *Heritage Foundation Reports* July 6, 1988

¹⁷⁶ Cabrita, Joao. *Mozambique: The Tortuous Road to Democracy* (Palgrave, 2000)

¹⁷⁷ Cabrita, Joao. *Mozambique: The Tortuous Road to Democracy* (Palgrave, 2000) pages 66-67, 72, 80-84, 88-89, 92, 110, 111, 127, 128, 131, 181, 235, 248, 249, 250, 256, 267, 271.

Soviet designs for the domination of southern Africa were confirmed by high level Frelimo defectors. Former Mozambican secret police director (SNASP) director Jorge da Costa stated in 1982 that *“Southern Africa with its mineral and agricultural wealth is of strategic importance to them (the Soviets) and is their (the Soviets) main target. In the 21st century food will be the biggest problem.”*¹⁷⁸

Jorge Da Costa revealed that the Soviet bloc exploited Mozambique under the guise of lending assistance to that communist country. He noted *“The Russians control the fishing industry. They have a navy at Zavola down the coast from Beira. They are mining our minerals and exploiting our coal resources and we were getting precious little in return. The Cubans were ‘helping us’ with the sugar industry and the coffee. We never saw it. The Romanians were farming rice and cotton for export. The East Germans were into everything: maize, wheat, cattle, textiles, and citrus. We saw little of it. The Bulgarians supplied all the machinery and the technical staff. And from the agreements I could see that they had such a hold on us that they would never let go.”*¹⁷⁹

The Soviets and their allies sent troops to assist Frelimo. Before 1975, the Soviets dispatched *“journalists”* to *“liberated zones”* within Mozambique.¹⁸⁰ Perhaps some of these *“journalists”* were undercover KGB or GRU agents dispatched to assist Frelimo in the field. Former SNASP director Jorge Da Costa also alleged that the Soviets maintained 4,000 to 5,000 troops in Mozambique that were commanded by KGB General Anatoli Shadrin. One thousand East German troops were commanded by General Gunter Weinrich of the Stasi. Colonel Haras Sanchez of the Cuban DGI commanded 4,000 troops in Mozambique. Mugabe’s Zimbabwe sent a large contingent of troops to Mozambique.¹⁸¹ The Frelimo armed forces were trained by Qaddafi’s Libya and were sent back to Mozambique in 1984. In 1987, 3,000 Tanzanian troops entered Mozambique to assist Frelimo.¹⁸²

The Mozambicans sought to dominate southern Africa through the training of various communist terrorist movements who were actively fighting noncommunist governments in the region. At a Frelimo Party Congress (1977) Machel himself promised that Mozambique would become a *“revolutionary base”* from which anti-communist white ruled governments would be overthrown.¹⁸³ Mozambique provided military training and political indoctrination to leftist revolutionaries in FRELIMO camps from Malawi, Swaziland, and Kenya. In December 1978, Machel integrated FRELIMO regular troops and Mugabe’s Patriotic Front communist rebels into aggressive actions against Salisbury. In January 1979, Mozambique invaded Rhodesia with 200 regular soldiers. Mugabe’s Patriotic Front used Mozambican transport, logistics, and armories. Modern Soviet radio communications equipment provided Mugabe’s Patriotic Front with a direct link to their three Mozambican sector headquarters and the main command headquarters in

¹⁷⁸ “Mozambican Tells Why He Defected” Daily Dispatch June 8, 1982

¹⁷⁹ “Da Costa File” Scope February 11, 1983 page 32.

¹⁸⁰ Golan, Galia. The Soviet Union and National Liberation Movements in the Third World (Unwin Hyman 1988)

¹⁸¹ “Da Costa File” Scope February 11, 1983 page 40.

¹⁸² Cabrita, Joao. Mozambique: The Tortuous Road to Democracy (Palgrave, 2000)

¹⁸³ Ottaway, David. “Mozambique to Be ‘Revolutionary Base’” Washington Post February 8, 1977 page A14.

Maputo.¹⁸⁴ A Soviet-trained Frelimo commander Daniel Caetano defected and revealed that Machel was turning Mozambique into a springboard for the communist conquest of Africa. He stated that “*Machel has turned the country into a training base for blacks from African moderate states, labeled by him as puppets of the capitalist and imperialist forces.*” Caetano revealed that leftists from Zimbabwe, Malawi, Swaziland, and Kenya trained at these camps. He stated: “*There they receive military training and communist indoctrination and are later sent back to their countries to foment uprisings against their governments.*” Caetano also claimed that the planes, tanks, and missiles were to be used by Frelimo and allied communists for the conquest of Africa: “*Machel’s ambition is to turn the African continent into a continent of communist states against the will of the peoples of those countries.*”¹⁸⁵

Despite the strong trade links between communist Mozambique and apartheid South Africa, the Frelimo regime backed ANC terrorists who were fighting to impose a pro-Moscow regime in Pretoria. Mozambique pledged support for the ANC, SWAPO, and the Patriotic Front in Rhodesia as a means of attacking Western imperialism.¹⁸⁶

Former SNASP director Jorge Da Costa also revealed the existence of Plan TV, which was formulated by a committee which consisted of Frelimo, South African ANC, and South African Communist Party (SACP) officials, including Oliver Tambo, Minister of Security Jacinto Veloso, and SACP General Secretary Joe Slovo. Plan TV was “*to establish a concrete and efficient plan of logistic, military, and security support to the ANC, in order to improve their offensive capability against the minority and racist regime of the Republic of South Africa.*” It was noted that Frelimo supplied the ANC with 2,000 FN FAL rifles captured from Rhodesian troops during the 1970s. ANC agents were also trained to pose as Mozambican miners who were employed under contract in South African mines. Da Costa noted “*We had used this technique before...The miners would be spies and informers and not actual terrorists. It was a very successful way of moving large numbers of ANC without arousing suspicion.*” A private Mozambican international road transport firm was established in 1982 to transport arms and munitions to the ANC in South Africa.¹⁸⁷

The ANC used Mozambique as a transit point to infiltrate its troops into South Africa. The Mozambican Border Guard Troops (TGF), trained by Soviet *Spetsnaz*, was used in this effort and had an operational radius of 50 km beyond the border with South Africa. ANC agents were disguised as migrant workers and infiltrated into South Africa using false passports issued by Frelimo. SACP official Joe Slovo was used to coordinate arms shipments from the USSR to Maputo.¹⁸⁸

Despite the Nkomati Accords, Frelimo still backed the ANC terrorists. As a signatory to the Nkomati Accords, Mozambique promised to halt its assistance to the ANC in return for the cessation of Pretoria’s support for the anti-communist forces fighting against Frelimo. The Nkomati Accords served as a sort of Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, which provided a respite for the Frelimo regime to recuperate from its losses in the war against the South African-backed anti-communist resistance forces. In June 1984, Samora Machel commented that the Nkomati Accord

¹⁸⁴ Kiracofe, Clifford A. “The Communist Takeover of Mozambique: An Overview” Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies pages 115-128.

¹⁸⁵ “Resistance Leader Hits Out” To The Point January 19, 1979

¹⁸⁶ Cabrita, Joao. Mozambique: The Tortuous Road to Democracy (Palgrave, 2000)

¹⁸⁷ “Da Costa File” Scope February 18, 1983 pages 29-33.

¹⁸⁸ Cabrita, Joao. Mozambique: The Tortuous Road to Democracy (Palgrave, 2000)

*“constitutes a victory for the Mozambican people and their socialist policy of peace. This accord has opened prospects for peace and good neighborliness in this region of our continent. With the Incomati accord armed banditry saw the drying up of the source which used to feed it. The time has come for us to deliver the final blow.”*¹⁸⁹

In April 1984, Machel commented that with the Nkomati Accord *“the Mozambique people, from the Rovuma river to the Maputo river, celebrated a victory of our socialist policy of peace. Incomati closes yet another chapter of the war of aggression against our independence and our revolution. Incomati marked the failure and non-viability of the imperialist-sponsored regional strategy, which was aimed at the destruction of the independent and progressive states of southern Africa...By negotiating with the Mozambique Government, South Africa recognized the lack of any political opposition in our country. By signing the Incomati accord, the main objective-the destruction of our state-failed. By signing the Incomati accord, we confirmed the reason for our fight-peace. It is only with peace that we can carry out our objective of defending the fatherland, over-coming backwardness and building socialism. While it is true that Incomati has crowned our socialist policy of peace, it is also true that we came out of this fight with deep wounds...The accord defends revolution. It defends the cause of socialism. It defends the most profound and legitimate aspirations of peoples. It is an act of solidarity with all other initiatives which are taking place throughout the world with the same objective of peace.”*¹⁹⁰

In March 1984, Machel noted at a rally *“Listen to this properly. This is the meaning of the pact (with South Africa). It is to defend our independence; it is to defend our state and our sovereignty, it is to defend our territorial integrity. With it, we are finally defending every Mozambique national. There is something else. The pact defends the revolution, it defends our social transformation, it defends our economic transformation, it defends scientific and technical transformation. We did not sign an accord with the South African party. We did not sign an accord of political and ideological coexistence. Do you understand?...Greater vigilance is required because we have signed the accord. It is not an ideological accord...South Africa has its political and economic system, which is different from ours. They are antagonistic systems. Do you understand? We are for socialism, we are against capitalism. Do you understand? Therefore, it is not a question of coexistence of systems in the ideological sense.”*¹⁹¹

As I previously mentioned, Frelimo still backed the ANC terrorists. In 1986, South African Army reported that *“the banned South African Communist Party and second in command of the military wing of the ANC, Joe Slovo, had been seen on a number of occasions in Maputo since the beginning of the year after his arrival in that country from Angola. It is suspected that Slovo serves as the link between ANC training camps in Angola and transit camps in Mozambique. During his visits to Mozambique Slovo is accompanied by Mozambican government officials, and he travels on a British passport. During August he was in East Germany where a second ANC training base was opened at Telton near Berlin. This base, which complements one that has been in existence for some time, is manned by Soviet instructors...a number of terrorists who had been arrested in the past in connection with terrorist attacks in the eastern Transvaal had infiltrated the country through Mozambique. Two were caught trying to cross the border into Mozambique. Since the beginning of the year about 23 terrorist attacks*

¹⁸⁹ “President of Mozambique’s Independence Anniversary Speech” Maputo home service June 27, 1984

¹⁹⁰ “Mozambique President on Accord with S Africa” Maputo home service April 10, 1984

¹⁹¹ “Machel’s 17th March Maputo Rally Speech” Maputo home service March 20, 1984

have been perpetrated in South Africa from Mozambique."¹⁹² South African General Magnus Malan noted in 1987 that ANC *"terrorists who were based in Mozambique admitted the Nkomati Accord provided them with freedom of movement, because of restrictions placed on South Africa by the accord. They felt themselves free to carry out acts of terrorism without any fear. With the support provided by the Frelimo government, the ANC has expanded its activities in Mozambique."*¹⁹³

In July 1989, 200 ANC terrorists arrived in Mozambique. These ANC soldiers were flown into Beira Mozambique in Soviet-made Antelope transport aircraft. These ANC terrorists were met by members of SNASP.¹⁹⁴

Attempts were made to manipulate the Malawian youth and armed forces through cultural and cooperation exchanges. Mozambique opened their borders to leftist anti-Banda guerrillas coming from Tanzania.¹⁹⁵ Frelimo also colluded with Zimbabwe, Cuba, and the Soviet Union in drawing up invasion plans to assist Malawian leftists in *"liberating"* their country. According to captured documents, former Mozambican communist president Samora Machel recommended that: *"Mozambique and Zimbabwe must bring into being a new force in Malawi. Banda is worn out. We must not allow South Africa to set the course in Malawi. We must not allow the English, Americans and the Federal Republic of Germany to choose the Malawi leaders. The Army knows how these things must be done... We can also organize a Malawi Liberation Front, equip ourselves and infiltrate into Malawi in order to destroy the bandits (the Renamo guerrillas) who are there. We may also define the targets for such a front for the liberation of Malawi."*

Machel laid out this aggressive plan against Malawi to a secret conference with the Zimbabwean Minister of State Security Emmerson Munangagwa, the Zimbabwean Ambassador to Mozambique H.E. Mvundura, Minister of Defense E.R. Kadungure, Zimbabwean Army Commander General Rex Nhongo, Air Marshal J. Tungamirai, Maj-Gen Maseko, and Lt-Col Shumba, of the Zimbabwe National Army. Soviet and Cuban officials were also present at this planning meeting. Machel noted that *"'military men' had to place 'all available means in Zambezia,' the province bordering Malawi... 'We have some special forces for special operations, we have about 41 MiG-21 (jet fighters)...the victory is being planned...it demands cold-bloodedness.' The transport of troops and equipment of Zambezia and Tete provinces was discussed, with the vital role Zimbabwe's transport facilities would play here, and the organization of medical services and food."*

Machel also stated that *"The military action had to be backed by political action and Malawi had to be persuaded to allow Zimbabwean troops to cross its territory into Zambezia. The people of Malawi had to be convinced the Mozambique and Zimbabwe forces were in 'solidarity' with them and not their government. Mr. Munangagwa told President Machel, 'there is a force ready to go,' but that there were preparations that had to be jointly made with*

¹⁹² "South African Allegations of ANC-Mozambique Links" Johannesburg home service October 10, 1986

¹⁹³ "S Africa's Malan Warns Mozambique About Accommodation of 'Terrorists'" Johannesburg television October 16, 1987

¹⁹⁴ "Mozambique accused of violating Nkomati accords by accommodating ANC 'terrorists'" Radio Truth July 3, 1989

¹⁹⁵ Cabrita, Joao. Mozambique: The Tortuous Road to Democracy (Palgrave, 2000)

*Zimbabwe. Problems with the transport of military hardware from Mozambique harbours were also raised...*¹⁹⁶

There was evidence that Frelimo backed other communist movements outside the region of southern Africa, no doubt as part of their contribution to the “*internationalist*” struggle. In 1988, Renamo forces captured an East German freighter that previously transported weapons to Kenya for Yusuf Hassan’s Kenyan guerrilla organization. Reportedly, Kenyan leftist guerrillas were being supported by Mozambique.¹⁹⁷ Former FP-25 extreme left guerrilla Valentim de Sousa commanded another 1,700 troops in Mozambique. Frelimo also funded FP-25 terrorist activities in Portugal.¹⁹⁸

Clearly, Moscow delegated to its Third World satrapies the task of direct troop intervention in conflicts in other developing nations. Afghanistan, Vietnam, Cuba, Grenada, Angola, Mozambique, and Eastern European nations were all tasked for the duty of “*proletarian internationalism*” during the Cold War. These activities continued even in the “*post-Cold War*” period, where communism in the USSR and its anti-Americanism was supposedly dissolved. Despite the omissions in mainline historical textbooks, many Rothbardian/Ron Paul libertarians, and the American left, the Soviets and their allies based and stationed troops all over the world. This essay, along with other books that the author has written, unequivocally proves the assertion made in the preceding sentence. It is in America’s long term interests to continue to provide assistance to governments that are beleaguered by Moscow and Beijing-supported insurgents and client states. If such assistance is terminated, one could easily face a domino effect where the United States is surrounded by hostile nations and global supply chains are impaired. However, the first step is to realize that the Cold War did not truly end...Moscow just assumed another face in late 1991.

¹⁹⁶ “South Africa Says Zimbabwe and Mozambique Planned to Attack Malawi” South African Press Association November 6, 1986

¹⁹⁷ “Mozambican rebels claim capture of sailors from GDR vessel” West German Press Agency September 2, 1988

¹⁹⁸ Cabrita, Joao. Mozambique: The Tortuous Road to Democracy (Palgrave, 2000)